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1trANSLAtOr’S PrefACe
The text used for this translation is the 1895 edition of Monadologie 
et Sociologie, in Gabriel Tarde (1895) Essais et mélanges sociologiques, 
Lyon, A. Storck / Paris, G. Masson, pp. 309-389. This text is a re-
worked and expanded version of an article published in 1893 as 
‘Monads and Social Science’ (‘Les Monades et la Science Sociale’), 
Revue Internationale de Sociologie, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 157-173 and vol. 
1, no. 3, pp. 231-246. The earlier version corresponds to chapters I, 
IV, V and VI of the 1895 text. A small amount of material is in the 
earlier version of the text but not the later version; this is given in 
the notes to this translation (minor stylistic variants between the 
two are not noted). 
Two modern editions of the original text are available: Éric 
Alliez (ed.), Le Plessis, Institut Synthélabo, 1999; M. Bergeron 
(ed.), Québec, Cégep, 2002, available at http://classiques.uqac.ca/
classiques/tarde_gabriel/monadologie/monadologie.html). 
These editions give no sources of Tarde’s citations; J. Sarnes and 
M. Schillmeier’s German translation (Gabriel Tarde, Monadologie 
und Soziologie, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 2009) gives a few but not 
all. I have attempted to trace all the citations, without complete 
success; however, it is likely that some passages marked as cita-
tions in the text are paraphrases rather than verbatim quotes. 
References given are to English translations where available.
Tarde uses the masculine gender throughout when referring 
to persons in general; the translation conforms to this usage. 
I would like to thank Isaac Marrero-Guillamón and Dan Cryan 
for their assistance.
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5MONADOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY 
Hypotheses fingo1
I
The monads, children of Leibniz, have come a long way since their 
birth. By several independent paths, unremarked by scientists 
themselves, they slip into the heart of contemporary science. It 
is a remarkable fact that all the secondary hypotheses implicit in 
this great hypothesis, at least in its essentials if not in its strictly 
Lebnizian form, are now being proved scientifically. The hypoth-
esis implies both the reduction of two entities, matter and mind, 
to a single one, such that they are merged in the latter, and at the 
same time a prodigious multiplication of purely mental agents in 
the world. In other words, it implies both the discontinuity of the 
elements and the homogeneity of their being. Moreover, it is only 
on these two conditions that the universe is wholly transparent to 
the gaze of the intellect. Now, on the one hand, as a result of hav-
ing been sounded a thousand times and judged unfathomable, the 
abyss which separates movement and consciousness, object and 
subject, the mechanical and the logical, has at length been called 
once more into question, relegated to the status of an appearance, 
and finally denied altogether by the bravest souls, who have been 
echoed from every quarter. On the other hand, the progress of 
chemistry leads us to affirm the atom and to deny the material 
continuity which the continuous character of the physical and liv-
ing manifestations of matter, extension, movement and growth 
        1. [Trans. Note: The epigraph references Newton’s famous tag ‘hypothe-
ses non fingo’ (I make no hypotheses), in the General Scholium to the Principia 
Mathematica.]
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seem superficially to reveal. There is nothing more profoundly 
surprising than the combination of chemical substances in defi-
nite proportions, to the exclusion of any intermediate proportion. 
Here there is no evolution and no transition: the dividing lines are 
clear and stark; and yet hence arises everything which is supple 
and harmoniously graduated in phenomena, almost as if the con-
tinuity of nuances were impossible without the discontinuity of 
colours. The path of chemistry is not the only one which seems to 
lead us in its progress to the monads; so too do physics, the natural 
sciences, history, and even mathematics. As Lange says: ‘Of great 
importance, not only for this demonstration, but also especially for 
its far-reaching consequences, was Newton’s assumption that the 
gravitation of a planet is only the sum of the gravitation of all its 
individual portions. From this immediately flowed the inference 
that the terrestrial bodies gravitate towards each other; and fur-
ther, that even the smallest particles of these masses attract each 
other’.2 With this viewpoint, which was much more original than 
it seems today, Newton broke, and indeed pulverized the individu-
ality of the celestial body, which had until then been regarded as a 
superior unity whose internal relations bore no resemblance to its 
relations with other bodies. Great strength of mind was required 
to resolve this apparent unity into a multiplicity of distinct ele-
ments linked to each other in the same way as they are linked to 
the elements of other aggregates. The beginning of the progress 
of physics and astronomy can be dated to the day when this view-
point replaced the contrary prejudice.
In this respect the founders of cellular theory have shown 
themselves to be Newton’s true heirs. In the same way they have 
broken apart the unity of the living body, they have resolved it into 
a prodigious number of elementary organisms, isolated and egois-
tic, eager (avides) to develop themselves at the expense of the exte-
rior, where the exterior includes their neighbouring brother cells 
as well as the inorganic particles of air, water, and all other sub-
stances. Schwann’s3 position on this point has been no less fer-
tile than Newton’s. Thanks to his cellular theory, we know that 
‘there is no vital force, as a principle distinct from matter, either 
        2. [Trans. Note: Ludwig Lange (1863-1936), History of Materialism: And Criticism 
of its Present Importance, vol. I, trans. E. C. Thomas, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trübner, 1925, p. 311.]
        3. [Trans. Note: Theodor Schwann (1810-1882) was one of the key early propo-
nents of the theory that all living organisms are made up of cells.]
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in the entirety of the organism, or in each cell. All phenomena of 
vegetable or animal life must be explained by the properties of atoms 
[let us say of the ultimate elements from which atoms are com-
posed], whether these be the known forces of inert nature or forc-
es hitherto unknown’.4 There is surely nothing more positivist or 
better conformed to a healthy and serious science than this radi-
cal negation of the vital principle, against which vulgar spiritual-
ism likes to protest. However, it is clear where this tendency will 
lead us, if drawn to its logical conclusion: to the monads, which 
fulfil the most daring promises of Leibnizian spiritualism. Like 
the vital principle, illness, which was treated as a person by the 
ancient medical writers, has been pulverized into a great number 
of infinitesimal disorders of the histological elements. Moreover, 
thanks primarily to the discoveries of Pasteur, the parasitic theo-
ry of illness, which explains these disorders by means of the in-
ternal conflicts of miniscule organisms, finds more general appli-
cation every day, and indeed excessively so, to the point where it 
should provoke some reaction. But parasites, too, have their para-
sites. And so on. The infinitesimal again!
The new theories in chemistry have been formed along anal-
ogous lines. As Wurtz says: ‘This is the new and essential point. 
The properties of the radicals are referred to the elements themselves. 
Formerly they were considered as a whole. To the radical regarded 
as a whole was attributed the power of combining with or of being 
substituted for simple bodies. This was the fundamental point of 
view of Gerhardt’s theory of types. We now go further. To discov-
er and define the properties of radicals we go back to the atoms of 
which they are composed’.5 This eminent chemist’s thought goes 
further than our remarks above. The examples which he cites 
demonstrate that, among the atoms of a radical, there is one in 
particular on whose atomicity and as yet unsatisfied avidity, out-
lasting the saturation of all the others, the combination which is 
produced ultimately depends.
Like stars, like living things, like illnesses, like chemical radi-
cals, nations are nothing more than entities which have long been 
        4. [Trans. Note: These two sentences are marked as a citation in the text, but 
appear to be not a verbatim quote but a summary paraphrase of the final section 
(‘Theory of the Cells’) of T. Schwann, Microscopical researches into the accor-
dance in the structure and growth of animals and plants, trans. H. Smith, London, 
Sydenham Society, 1847.]
        5. [Trans. Note: A. Wurtz, The Atomic Theory, trans. E. Cleminshaw, London, 
Kegan Paul, 1880, pp. 265-266 (Tarde’s emphasis).]
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taken for true beings in the ambitious and sterile theories of so-
called philosophical historians. Has it not, for example, been suf-
ficiently repeated that it is foolish to seek the cause of a political or 
social revolution in the influence of writers, of statesmen, or of any 
kind of instigator, and that it rather springs spontaneously from 
the genius of the race, from the bowels of the people, that anony-
mous and superhuman agent? But this convenient point of view, 
which consists in mistakenly seeing the creation of a new being 
in a phenomenon generated by the encounter of real beings (albe-
it a genuinely new and unforeseen phenomenon), can be upheld 
only provisionally. Having been rapidly exhausted by the literary 
abuses it has suffered, it is conducive to a serious return towards a 
clearer and more positive form of explanation, which accounts for 
a given historical event only by individual actions, and particularly 
by the action of inventive men who served as a model for others 
and reproduced thousands of copies of themselves, like mother-
cells of the social body.
This is not all: these ultimate elements which form the final 
stage of every science, the social individual, the living cell, the 
chemical atom, are ultimate only from the point of view of their 
particular science. They themselves, as we know, are composite, 
not excepting the atom itself which, according to Thomson’s hy-
pothesis of the ‘vortex atom’,6 the most plausible or the least un-
acceptable of the conjectures which have been attempted on this 
subject, would be a whirling mass of simpler elements. Lockyer’s7 
studies of solar and stellar spectra have led him to suppose—and 
the conjecture seems probable—that certain weak lines observed 
by him are due to the elements of which are composed certain sub-
stances that on our planet are regarded as incomposite.
Scientists who live in daily contact with the so-called elements 
have no doubt of their complexity. While Wurtz shows himself to 
be favourable to Thomson’s hypothesis, Berthelot says for his part: 
‘The deeper study of the elementary masses which, on our cur-
rent understanding, constitute the simple bodies leads every day 
more and more to an understanding of them not as indivisible at-
oms, homogenous and admitting of movement only as a whole, 
        6. [Trans. Note: J. J. Thomson’s ‘nebular’ or ‘vortex atom’ theory, prior to the 
discovery of the electron, posited that the atom consisted of nebular ‘vortices’ in 
the ether. As of the writing of Monadology and Sociology, little was known of the 
internal structure of the atom.]
        7. [Trans. Note: Norman Lockyer (1836-1920), astronomer and pioneer of astro-
nomical spectroscopy.]
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but as highly complex constructions, furnished with a specific ar-
chitecture and animated by highly varied internal movements’.8 
Physiologists, for their part, do not maintain that the protoplasm 
is a homogenous substance, and judge only the solid part of the 
cell to be active and truly living. The soluble part, almost in its en-
tirety, is nothing but a storehouse for fuel and nourishment (or a 
mass of excrement). Moreover, a better understanding of the solid 
part itself would doubtless lead us to eliminate almost everything 
from it. And, where will this process of elimination finish if not 
at a geometrical point, that is, at pure nothingness? Unless, as we 
will explain below, this point is a centre. And, in fact, in the true 
histological element (which is designated only improperly by the 
word ‘cell’) what it is essential to take into account is not its limit 
or envelope, but rather the central focus whence it seems to aspire 
to radiate indefinitely until the day when the cruel experience of 
external obstacles obliges it to close in on itself in order to preserve 
its being; but we are getting ahead of ourselves.
There is no way to call a halt to this descent to the infinitesi-
mal, which, most unexpectedly, becomes the key to the entire uni-
verse. This may explain the growing importance of the infinitesi-
mal calculus; and, for the same reason, the stunning and rapid 
success of the theory of evolution. In this theory, a specific form 
is, as a geometer would say, the integral of innumerable differen-
tials called individual variations, which are themselves due to cel-
lular variations, whose basis consists of a myriad of elementary 
changes. The source, reason, and ground of the finite and separate 
is in the infinitely small, in the imperceptible: this is the profound 
conviction which inspired Leibniz, and continues to inspire our 
transformists.
But why should such a transformation, which is incomprehen-
sible if presented as a sum of definite and discrete differences, be 
readily understood if we consider it as a sum of infinitely small 
differences? We must show first of all that this is a real contrast. 
Suppose that, by some miracle, a body disappears and is annihilat-
ed from the place A where it was, then appears and comes back into 
being at the place Z a metre away from A, without having traversed 
the intermediate positions: such a displacement is beyond the power 
of our mind to grasp, while we would never be astonished to see 
this body move from A to Z along a line of juxtaposed positions. 
        8. [Trans. Note: Marcellin Berthelot (1827-1907), chemist. The citation has not 
been traced.]
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However, note that in the first case, we would have been no less 
amazed had we seen such an abrupt disappearance and reappear-
ance take place over a distance of half a metre, or of 30, of 20, of 
10, of 2 centimetres, or of any perceptible fraction of a millime-
tre. Our reason, if not our imagination, would be just as struck 
in the last case as in the original example. In the same way, if we 
are presented with two distinct living species, be they very distant 
or closely related, a fungus and a labiate herb, or two herbs of the 
same genus, in neither case will it be comprehensible that one 
could suddenly and with no transition turn into the other. But, if 
we were to be told that by hybridization the fertilized ovule of the 
one had undergone a deviation, extremely slight at first and then 
gradually increasing, from its habitual pathway, we would have no 
difficulty in accepting this. It will be argued that the inconceiv-
ability of the first hypothesis is due to a prejudice which has been 
formed in us by the association of ideas. Nothing could be truer, 
and precisely this proves that reality, the source of the experience 
which gave birth to this prejudice, conforms to the explanation of 
the finite by the infinitesimal. For pure reason, and still more rea-
son alone, would never have guessed at this hypothesis; it would 
even, perhaps, be more inclined to see in the large the source of 
the small than in the small the source of the large, and it would 
gladly believe in divine forms which are complete ab initio, which 
could envelop a clod of earth all at once and penetrate it from the 
outside to the inside. It would even willingly agree with Agassiz9 
that, from the outset, trees have been forests, bees hives, men na-
tions. Science has been able to eliminate this point of view only by 
the rebellion of contrary facts. To mention only the most obvious, 
it is the case that an immense sphere of light spread through space 
is due to the unique vibration, multiplied by contagion, of one cen-
tral atom of ether,10—that the entire population of a species origi-
nates from the prodigious multiplication of one unique first ovu-
lary cell, in a kind of generative radiation,—that the presence of 
the correct astronomical theory in millions of human brains is 
due to the multiplied repetition of an idea which appeared one day 
in a cerebral cell of Newton’s brain. But, once more, what follows 
        9. [Trans. Note: Louis Agassiz (1807-1873), palaeontologist. Tarde’s reference is 
to Agassiz’ defence of special creation––the position that animal species and hu-
man ‘races’ were separately created by God––and of the fixity and unchangeabil-
ity of the species thus created.] 
        10. [Trans. Note: The ether, in the physics of Tarde’s time, is the all-pervading 
substance which serves as the medium through which light propagates.]
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from this? If the infinitesimal differed from the finite only by degree, 
if at the basis of things as at their perceptible surface there exist-
ed only positions, distances, and displacements, why would a dis-
placement which is inconceivable in the finite realm change its 
nature in becoming infinitesimal? The infinitesimal, therefore, is 
qualitatively different from the finite; movement has a cause dis-
tinct from itself; being is not exhausted by what appears in phe-
nomena. Everything comes from the infinitesimal and everything 
returns to it; nothing in the sphere of the finite and complex—a 
surprising fact which nobody is surprised at—appears suddenly, 
nor dies away. What should we conclude from this, if not that the 
infinitely small, in other words the element, is the source and the 
goal, the substance and the reason of all things?—While the prog-
ress of physics leads physicists to quantify nature in order to un-
derstand it, it is remarkable that the progress of mathematics leads 
mathematicians, in order to understand quantity, to resolve it into 
elements which are not at all quantitative.11
This growing importance which the growth of knowledge 
grants to the concept of the infinitesimal is all the more curious 
since the latter, in its ordinary form (leaving aside for a moment 
the monadic hypothesis), is nothing but a mass of contradictions. 
I will leave to Renouvier12 the task of pointing them out. By what 
power could the absurd grant to the human mind the key to the 
world? Is it not because, through this purely negative concept, we 
aim at but do not reach, or look at but do not see, a much more 
positive concept which we do not own, but which should nonethe-
less be inscribed as a reminder in the inventory of our intellectual 
assets? This absurdity could very well be only the outer covering 
of a reality alien to everything we know, outside everything, space 
and time, matter and mind … Outside mind? If so, the monadic 
hypothesis should be rejected … but this must be examined fur-
ther. However this question is resolved, these tiny beings which 
we call infinitesimal will be the real agents, and these tiny varia-
tions which we call infinitesimal will be the real actions.
Indeed, it seems to follow from the preceding that these agents 
are autonomous, and that these variations clash and obstruct one 
        11. [Trans. Note: Tarde may be thinking here of the work of Georg Cantor and 
Richard Dedekind in the 1870s and 1880s on the set-theoretical foundations of 
natural number.]
        12. [Trans. Note: Charles Renouvier (1815-1903), philosopher. Renouvier 
strongly criticized the concepts of infinite and infinitesimal magnitude as logi-
cally contradictory.]
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another as much as they compete. If everything comes from the 
infinitesimal, it is because an element, a unique element, initiates 
some change, movement, vital evolution, or mental or social trans-
formation. If all these changes are gradual and apparently con-
tinuous, this shows that the initiative undertaken by the element, 
even if it receives some support, has also encountered some resis-
tance. Let us imagine that all the citizens of a State, without excep-
tion, are fully in favour of a programme of political reorganization 
springing from the brain of one among their number, and more 
particularly from one point within this brain; the complete over-
haul of the State according to this plan, rather than being progres-
sive and fragmentary, will then be abrupt and total, however radi-
cal the project. The slowness of social modifications is explained 
only by the fact that the other plans for reform or ideals of the State 
which all other members of a nation knowingly or unknowingly 
entertain run contrary to this plan. In the same way, if matter were 
as inert and passive as is generally believed, I do not see why move-
ment, in other words gradual displacement, should exist, nor why 
the formation of an organism should be subject to the progress of 
its embryonic phases, an obstacle opposed to the immediate real-
ization of its adult stage which was nonetheless from the begin-
ning the aim of the germ’s impulse. 
The idea of the straight line, let it be noted, is not the exclusive 
property of geometry. There is a biological rectilinearity and a logi-
cal rectilinearity. In the same way that, in passing from one point 
to another, the abbreviation or diminution of the number of inter-
vening points cannot continue indefinitely and must stop at the 
limit which we call the straight line, just so, in the passage from 
one specific form to another, from an individual state to another, 
there is a minimal, irreducible intervening series of forms or states 
which must be traversed, which alone may perhaps explain the ab-
breviated repetition by the embryo of some of the successive forms 
of its ancestors; and similarly, in expounding a body of knowledge, 
is there not a way to go straight from one thesis to the next, and 
does it not consist in linking them by a chain of logical positions 
or positings which necessarily come in between the two? A tru-
ly surprising necessity. This rational, rectilinear order of exposi-
tion, much favoured by introductory books which summarize in 
a few pages the labour of centuries (and the limit of the ambition 
of such volumes), coincides frequently but not invariably, and in 
many points but not in all, with the historical order of appearance 
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of the successive discoveries which are synthesized in the science. 
Perhaps this is the case with the famous recapitulation of phylog-
eny by ontogeny,13 which would then be the rectification and not 
only the prodigious acceleration of the more or less winding path 
along which the ancestral forms, the accumulated biological inven-
tions which are bequeathed all together to the ovule, followed one 
another in previous eras.14
The real support which the theory of evolution gives to the 
monadological hypotheses will be still more evident if we imagine 
this great system in the new forms which it will soon take on, and 
whose outline can already be seen. For evolutionary theory itself 
evolves. It evolves not by a series or a competition of blind group-
ings, or of fortuitous and involuntary adaptations to the observed 
facts, in conformity with the procedures of transformation which it 
wrongly attributes to living nature, but by the accumulated efforts 
of perfectly aware scientists and theoreticians, knowingly and vol-
untarily occupied in modifying the fundamental theory to fit it as 
closely as possible to the scientific data known to them, and also to 
the preconceived ideas they hold dear. This theory is for them a ge-
neric form which they are working to specify, each in his own way. 
But, among these various products of the unprecedented fermen-
tation created by Darwin, there are only two which add to or sub-
stitute for the master’s own idea something truly new and fertile. I 
refer firstly to the evolution by association of elementary organisms 
into more complex organisms formulated by Edmond Perrier,15 
and secondly by the evolution by leaps or crises,16 which, suggest-
ed and predicted some years ago by Cornet’s prescient writings,17 
        13. [Trans. Note: Reading ontogenèse with the 1893 text; the 1895 text has auto-
genèse (autogeny).]
        14. [Trans. Note: The theory of ontogenetic recapitulation, most famously for-
mulated by Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) as ‘ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny’, 
holds that the developing embryo ‘recapitulates’ in miniature the evolution of 
the species.]
        15. [Trans. Note: Edmond Perrier (1844-1921), zoologist. As described by Tarde, 
Perrier propounded the theory that higher organisms evolved from colonies or as-
sociations of smaller organisms. See E. Perrier, Les Colonies animales et la forma-
tion des organismes, Paris, Masson, 1881. The 1893 text cites Perrier’s courses at 
the Museum (the National Museum of Natural History in Paris) and adds the fol-
lowing footnote: ‘This biological theory has the advantage that it agrees in every 
point with the linguistic theory of the formation of languages by the aggregation 
of several words into one’.] 
        16. [Trans. Note: The 1893 text adds the English phrase ‘saltatory evolution’.]
        17. [Trans. Note: Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1877), mathematician, econ-
omist and philosopher. See his Traité de l’enchaînement des idées fondamentales, 
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has spontaneously sprouted anew18 here and there in the minds of 
several contemporary scientists. The specific transformation of a 
pre-existing form in view of a new adaptation, according to one of 
these theorists, must have come about at a given moment in a qua-
si-immediate manner (that is, I think, very short relative to the pro-
digious duration of species once they are formed, but perhaps very 
long with respect to our brief existence) and, he adds, by a regular 
process and not by groping its way forward. Similarly, for another 
transformist, the species, from its relatively rapid formation up to 
its equally rapid decomposition, actually remains fixed within cer-
tain limits, because it is essentially in a state of stable organic equi-
librium. Deeply troubled in its own constitution by any excessive 
change in its environment (or by any internal revolution due to the 
contagious rebellion of an element) the organism goes beyond its 
species only, as it were, to roll onto the slope of another species, 
itself in stable equilibrium, and there remains for some period of 
time which for us would be an eternity.
Of course, I need not here discuss these conjectures. It is suf-
ficient to note that they are growing, or rather advancing through 
the undergrowth, still lowly but pervasive, while natural selection 
loses ground every day, showing itself better at purifying forms 
than perfecting them, and better at perfecting them than fun-
damentally modifying them. I would add that, by the one or the 
other of the two ways mentioned above, we are necessarily led to 
populate and fill living bodies with spiritual or quasi-spiritual at-
oms. To what may we ascribe the need for society which Perrier 
sees as the soul of the organic world, if not to tiny persons? And 
what could this transformation be, this direct, regular, and rapid 
process imagined by other thinkers, if not the accomplishment 
section III.8, Œuvres complètes, Vol. III, N. Bruyère (ed.), Paris, Vrin, 1982, pp. 
267-277.]
        18. [Trans. Note: The 1893 text adds: ‘… sprouted anew at once in the mind of 
two contemporary scientist, both avowed transformists. By one of those coinci-
dences which often occur in the history of science, and which invariably denote 
the full maturity of an idea whose hour has come and which imperiously de-
mands attention, the latter of the above-mentioned hypotheses, published in 1877 
by the American naturalist Dall, was presented in 1879 at the scientific section 
of the Academy of Brussels by the Belgian scientist de Sélys Longchamps as his 
own discovery’. The idea in the next sentence is credited to de Sélys Longchamps 
(Michel-Edmond de Sélys Longchamps (1813-1900), naturalist) and in the sen-
tence following (‘another transformist’) to Dall (William Healey Dall (1845-1927), 
naturalist). See W. H. Dall (1877) On a provisional hypothesis of saltatory evolu-
tion. American Naturalist, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 135-137.]
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of hidden workers who collaborate in realizing some specific plan 
for reorganization previously conceived and willed by one among 
their number?
II
This should, I think, suffice to demonstrate how science tends 
to pulverize the universe and to multiply beings indefinitely. 
However, as already noted, science tends no less distinctly to unify 
the Cartesian duality of matter and mind. Hence it is inevitably led 
to, let us say not anthropomorphism, but psychomorphism. Monism 
can effectively be conceived in three ways (I am of course aware 
that this has been said many times before): either by seeing move-
ment and consciousness—for example the vibration of a cerebral 
cell and the corresponding mental state—as two sides of a single 
fact, in which case one misleads oneself by this reminder of the an-
cient Janus; or by not denying the heterogeneous nature of matter 
and mind, but making them flow from a common source, from a 
hidden and unknown mind, a position which gains nothing but a 
trinity instead of, and in the place of, a duality: or, finally, by hold-
ing resolutely that matter is mind, nothing more. This last thesis 
is the only comprehensible one, and the only one which truly leads 
to the desired reduction. But there are two ways in which it may be 
understood. We may say with the idealists that the material uni-
verse, other egos included, is mine, exclusively mine, and that it is 
composed of my states of mind or of their possibility to the extent 
that it is affirmed by me, that is, to the extent that this possibility 
is itself one of my states of mind. If this interpretation be rejected, 
the only option is to admit with the monadologists that the whole 
external universe is composed of souls distinct from my own but 
fundamentally similar. In accepting this latter point of view, it so 
happens that one removes from the former its best support. To rec-
ognize that one knows nothing of the being in itself of a stone or a 
plant, say, and at the same time to stubbornly persist in saying that 
it is, is logically untenable; the idea which we have of it, as may eas-
ily be shown, has for its only content our states of mind; and as, ab-
stracting away our states of mind, nothing remains, either it is only 
these states of mind which are affirmed when we affirm this sub-
stantial and unknowable X, or it must be admitted that in affirm-
ing some other thing, we affirm nothing. But if it is the case that 
this being in itself is fundamentally similar to our own being, then 
it will no longer be unknowable, and may consistently be affirmed.
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Thus monism leads us to universal psychomorphism. 
Hitherto, however, monism has been demonstrated less than it 
has been affirmed. It is true that when one sees physicists like 
Tyndall, naturalists like Haeckel, philosophical historians and art-
ists like Taine, and theorists of all schools,19 express the suspicion 
or the conviction that the hiatus between inside and outside, be-
tween sensation and vibration, is an illusion, then even if their 
arguments may not be convincing, the agreement of their con-
victions and presentiments has some importance. But, as soon as 
they attempt to put their finger on the alleged identity, this pre-
sumption loses all force in the face of the evident discord of the 
juxtaposed terms which they are trying to identify, namely move-
ment and sensation.
The reason is that at least one of these terms is an unfortunate 
choice. The contrast between the purely quantitative variations of 
movement, whose deviations are themselves measurable, and the 
purely qualitative variations of sensation, whether they concern 
colours, odors, tastes or sounds, is too shocking to our mind. But 
if, among our internal states, distinct ex hypothesi from sensation, 
there were to be found some which vary quantitatively, as I have 
attempted to show elsewhere,20 this singular character would per-
haps allow us to attempt to use them to spiritualize the universe. In 
my view, these two states of the soul, or rather these two forces of 
the soul which are called belief and desire, whence derive affirma-
tion and will, present this character eminently and distinctly. By 
the universality of their presence in all psychological phenomena, 
both human and animal, by the homogeneity of their nature from 
        19. [Trans. Note: John Tyndall (1820-1893), physicist; Ernst Haeckel (1834-
1919), biologist and naturalist; Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893), historian and liter-
ary critic. All argued for some form of dual-aspect monism, in which mind and 
matter are seen as two aspects of a single underlying reality. Tyndall, sometimes 
remembered as a thoroughgoing materialist, also seriously considered the idea of 
a ‘primeval union between spirit and matter’, such that they would be ‘two oppo-
site faces of the self-same mystery’ (‘Scientific Use of the Imagination’ (1870), in 
Fragments of Science, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1879, vol. II, pp. 101-136, 
on p. 133). Haeckel propounded a monism which ‘recognizes one sole substance 
in the universe, which is at once “God and nature”; body and spirit (or matter and 
energy) it holds to be inseparable’ (The Riddle of the Universe, trans. J. McCabe, 
London, Watts & Co., 1929, p. 16). Taine, finally, describes mind and matter as 
‘one and the same tongue, written in different characters’ (On Intelligence, trans. 
T. D. Haye, London, L. Reeve & Co., 1871, pp.297-8.)]
        20. [Trans. Note: The theory of belief and desire as psychological quantities 
goes back to Tarde’s early (1880) essay ‘La Croyance et le désir’ (‘Belief and desire’, 
in Essais et mélanges sociologiques); see particularly section II.] 
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one end of their immense gamut to the other, from the slightest 
inclination to believe or to want up to certainty and passion, and 
finally by their mutual penetration and by other no less striking 
signs of similarity, belief and desire play exactly the same role in 
the ego, with respect to sensations, as do space and time in the ex-
ternal world with respect to material elements. It remains to be 
examined whether this analogy does not conceal an identity, and 
whether, rather than being simply forms of our sensory experi-
ence, as their most profound analyst believed,21 space and time are 
not perhaps primitive concepts or continuous and original quasi-
sensations by which, thanks to our two faculties of belief and de-
sire, which are the common source of all judgements and hence 
of all concepts, the degrees and modes of belief and of desire of 
psychic agents other than ourselves are translated to us. On this 
hypothesis, the movement of bodies would be nothing other than 
types of judgements or objectives formulated by the monads.22
It will be seen that if this were the case, the universe would 
become perfectly transparent, and the open conflict between two 
opposing currents of contemporary science would be resolved. For 
if, on the one hand, science leads us towards vegetal psychology, 
to ‘cellular psychology’, and soon to atomic psychology, in a word 
to an entirely spiritual interpretation of the mechanical and mate-
rial world, on the other hand its tendency to explain everything, 
including thought, in mechanical terms is no less evident. In 
Haeckel’s ‘cellular psychology’,23 it is curious to see the alternation 
        21. [Trans. Note: The reference is to Kant’s theory of space and time as ‘pure 
forms of intuition’ in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Tarde speaks slightly loosely here, as Kant regards time as a form of inner as well 
as outer (sensory) intuition.] 
        22. According to Lotze, if there is anything spiritual in the atom, this must be 
pleasure and pain, rather than a concept; I maintain exactly the contrary. [Trans. 
Note: ‘If there is anything spiritual in an atom of material mass, we need not sup-
pose that it has any concept (Vorstellung) of its position in the world, or that the 
powers it exercises are accompanied by any effort (Strebung); but we may affirm 
that it inwardly perceives the pressure or shock, the dilation or contraction which 
it undergoes in the form of a feeling of pleasure or pain’. (H. Lotze, Medicinische 
Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele, Leipzig, Weidmann’sche Buchhandlung, 
1852, p. 134 = Principes généraux de psychologie physiologique, trans. A Penjon, 
Paris, G. Baillière & Cie, 1881, p. 133.]
        23. [Trans. Note: For a brief statement of Haeckel’s ‘cellular psychology’, see his 
The Riddle of the Universe (1899), trans. J. McCabe, London, Watts & Co., 1929, 
p. 145: ‘Just as we take the living cell to be the “elementary organism” in anato-
my and physiology, and derive the multicellular animal or plant from it, so, with 
equal right, we may consider the “cell-soul” to be the psychological unit, and the 
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of these two contradictory viewpoints between one line and the 
next. But the contradiction is resolved by the hypothesis set out 
above, and can only be resolved thus.
Moreover, this hypothesis is in no way anthropomorphic. 
Belief and desire have the unique privilege of including un-
conscious states. There certainly exist unconscious desires and 
judgements. These include, for example, the desires implicit in 
our pleasures and pains, and the judgements of localization and 
so on which are incorporated in our sensations. By contrast, un-
conscious and unfelt sensations are a manifest impossibility; if a 
few minds have thought to posit them, it is either because they 
have used this phrase mistakenly to refer to sensations which are 
not affirmed or discerned, or because, while understanding that 
it is really necessary to admit unconscious states of mind, they 
have wrongly understood sensations as capable of being such 
states. In addition, the facts which have been used to support the 
hypothesis of unconscious sensibility, already striking enough 
in themselves, also serve to prove general conclusions consider-
ably beyond this. They show that our own consciousness (that is, 
the directing monads or leading elements of the brain) has as its 
constant and indispensable collaborators innumerable other con-
sciousnesses whose modifications, external with respect to us, 
are for them internal states. Ball says: ‘Certain physiologists who 
take an interest in psychology have proved that we cannot forget 
anything. Traces of our previously received impressions accumu-
late in the cells of our brains, where they remain latent indefi-
nitely, until one day a superior influence awakens them from the 
tomb where they were buried in sleep … When in the course of a 
conversation one tries to remember a name, a date, or a fact, the 
information sought often escapes us, and only several hours lat-
er, when we are thinking of something else entirely, does it come 
spontaneously to offer itself to us. How can we explain this un-
expected revelation? It is because a mysterious secretary, a skilful 
automaton has been working for us while the intellect [he should 
have said our own intellect, the directing monad] neglects these 
trivial details’.24
complex psychic activity of the higher organism to be the result of the psychic ac-
tivity of the cells which compose it’. For a more in-depth exposition, see Zellseelen 
und Seelenzellen, Leipzig, Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1909.]
        24. [Trans. Note: Probably Benjamin Ball (1833-1893), psychologist. The cita-
tion has not been traced.]
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That psychiatrists find it necessary to have recourse to the 
metaphors of a secretary or an interior librarian to explain the phe-
nomena of memory, constitutes a strong presumption in favour 
of the monadic hypothesis. The monadological theory can there-
fore readily appropriate for itself the arguments of the English and 
German psychologists on this subject. But since, after all, it seems 
to be necessary to see as unconscious in some cases some states of 
mind, let it be noted that in truth, a desire or an act of faith not only 
can exist without being felt, but actually cannot be felt as such, any 
more than a sensation can be active by itself. Now, by this remark-
able characteristic, the two internal forces I have named are dis-
tinguished for us by being objectifiable (objectivable) to the highest 
degree. Since they may apply to any sensation whatsoever, howev-
er radically different these sensations may be from each other, to 
the colour red as to the note C or D, to the smell of a rose as to the 
feeling of cold or warmth, why may they not apply just as much 
to unknown and, I submit, unknowable phenomena, ex hypothesi 
different from sensations, but no more or less distinct from sensa-
tions than the latter are from each other? Why may sensation not 
be seen simply as a species of the genus quality, and may not one 
admit that there exist outside us non-sensory qualifying signs which, 
just like our sensations, may serve as the point of application for 
the psychic forces par excellence, namely the static force called be-
lief and the dynamic force called desire? It is perhaps from an in-
stinctive and confused feeling of this truth that the idea of force 
has been built on the model of desire, and the key to the univer-
sal enigma sought in this idea. Schopenhauer lifted the mask of 
this concept by calling it almost by its true name, will. But will 
is a combination of faith and desire, and the master’s disciples, 
Hartmann among them, had to add the idea to the will.25 They 
would have done better to break apart the will and distinguish in it 
the two elements. We may rightly be amazed that, among so many 
philosophical conjectures, it has occurred to nobody, at least ex-
plicitly, to seek in the objectification of belief rather than of desire 
the solution to the problems of physics and of life. At least explic-
itly; for without knowing it, we conceive of matter—coherent and 
solid substance, satisfied and at rest—not only with the help of, 
but in the image and likeness of our convictions, as we conceive of 
        25. [Trans. Note: Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906), philosopher. Where 
Schopenhauer based his thought on a strict separation of will and idea, Hartmann 
identified the two as dimensions of the unconscious.]
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force in the image of our efforts. Only Hegel glimpsed this truth, 
to judge by his conceit of composing the world from sequences 
of affirmations and negations. Hence perhaps, despite certain ab-
errations and strange subtleties, comes the air of architectural 
and magisterial grandeur which pervades his ruined work, and 
which marks, in general, the superiority of substantialist systems 
throughout history, from Democritus to Descartes, over the liveli-
est of dynamistic doctrines. Have we not seen monism, beneath 
the brilliant light of the currently prevailing evolutionism, which 
pushes to its limit the Leibnizian idea of force, attempting the re-
newal of the Spinozan concept of substance? For, as will moves 
towards certitude, as the movement of stars and atoms moves to-
wards their definitive agglomeration, the idea of force leads natu-
rally to the idea of substance, where, weary of the agitations of an 
illusory phenomenalism, grasping finally realities which are taken 
for immutable, idealist and materialist thought each in turn take 
refuge. But, of these two ascriptions to the mysterious external 
noumena of our two interior quantities, which is legitimate? Why 
may we not dare to say that both are?
It will perhaps be objected that this psychomorphism is a very 
easy solution, and all the more illusory for that, and that it is a 
delusion to pretend that one can explain vital, physical or chemi-
cal phenomena by psychological facts, since the latter are always 
more complex than the former. But, though I admit the complex-
ity of sensations and the complete legitimacy of explaining them 
by physiological facts, I cannot admit this of desire nor of belief. I 
maintain that analysis cannot get its teeth into these irreducible 
concepts. There is an unnoticed contradiction in the position that, 
on the one hand, an organism is a mechanism constructed in con-
formity to purely mechanical laws, and, on the other, that all the 
phenomena of mental life, including the two mentioned above, are 
purely products of the organization created by this life, and do not 
exist prior to it. If, in fact, the organized being is only an admi-
rably constructed machine, it should function like any other ma-
chine, in which not only no new force but not even any radically 
new product can possibly be created by the most marvellous ar-
rangements of wheels and cogs. A machine is nothing but a spe-
cial distribution and direction of pre-existing forces which traverse 
it without essentially altering it. It is nothing but a change of form 
of raw materials which it receives from outside and whose essence 
does not change. If then, once more, living bodies are machines, 
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the essential nature of those products and those forces which re-
sult from their functioning which are known to us fundamentally 
(sensations, thoughts, volitions) attests that the substances which 
nourish them (carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, hydrogen etc.) contain 
hidden psychic elements. In particular, among these superior re-
sults of the vital functions, there are two which are forces, and 
which, springing forth from the brain, could not have been creat-
ed there by the mechanical play of cellular vibrations. Can it be de-
nied that desire and belief are forces? Is it not clear that with their 
reciprocal combinations, passions and intentions, they are the per-
petual winds of history’s tempests, and the waterfalls which turn 
the mills of politics? What leads the world on and drives it in its 
course, if not beliefs religious or otherwise, ambitions and cupid-
ities? These so-called products are forces to such an extent that 
they alone can produce societies, which many contemporary phi-
losophers still maintain are true organisms. The products of an in-
ferior organism would then be factors of a superior organization! 
Thus, in admitting the dynamical character of these two states of 
mind, the conclusion (which in any case cannot be escaped by re-
garding them as products) acquires a higher degree of rigour. For 
we know that the forces employed by machines always emerge 
from them considerably less denatured than their raw materials. It 
follows that, if belief and desire are forces, it is probable that when 
they emerge from the body in our mental manifestations, they do 
not differ noticeably from how they were when they entered, in the 
form of molecular cohesions or affinities. The ultimate foundation 
of material substance would then be open to us; and it is worth 
the trouble of examining whether, in following through the con-
sequences of this point of view, we remain in agreement with the 
facts established by science. And here I have the advantage of being 
able to rely on the accumulated work of Schopenhauer, Hartmann 
and their school, who have, I believe, succeeded in showing the 
primordial and universal character, not of will, but of desire.
To cite only one example, consider a small mass of protoplasm, 
in which no sign of organization has been discovered, ‘a clear jel-
ly like the white of an egg’, as Perrier says. This jelly nonetheless, 
he adds, executes movements, captures animalcules, digests them, 
etc. It evidently has appetite, and consequently must have a more 
or less clear perception of what its appetite is for. If desire and be-
lief are nothing but products of organization, whence comes this 
perception and this appetite of an admittedly heterogeneous, but 
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not yet organized, mass? Almann, of the Royal Society of London, 
says: ‘The movements of spores seem frequently to obey a real vo-
lition; if the spore encounters an obstacle, it changes direction and 
moves back by changing the movement of its cilia’.26 A railway me-
chanic could do no better. Nonetheless, this spore is only a cell de-
tached from an immobile and insensible plant, to which we grant 
no will and no intelligence. But, lo and behold, intelligence and 
will all of a sudden appear in the daughter cell, even though they 
exist not at all, even virtually, in the mother cell! Let us rather say 
that, when it judges best to do so, when it is useful to its goal, to its 
particular cosmic plan whence proceed all its movements, the vi-
tal element reveals and unfolds its hidden resources. At first mixed 
with an infinity of others in an indivisible lump of protoplasm, 
at the desired moment it calls a halt to its indivision, it encloses 
and sequesters itself with a compact group of vassals, it throws up 
defensive ramparts of calcium; or else it stretches out its flagella 
like a rower extending his oars, and moves towards its prey. Every 
body of water contains myriads of these unicellular living beings 
which ‘construct for themselves a skeleton … of concentric spheres 
as transparent as crystal, and of a perfect symmetry and beauty’. 
Evidently the single cell under consideration could not accomplish 
these prodigious feats alone, and we must rather conclude that it 
was only the soul of a whole people of workers. But what expendi-
ture of psychic acts is required by such a task!
In truth, one might justifiably wonder, when one compares to 
cellular inventions, cellular industries, and cellular arts, as a spring 
day exhibits them to us, our arts, our industries, and our little hu-
man discoveries displayed in our periodical exhibitions, whether it 
is really certain that our own intelligence and will, those great egos 
disposing of the vast resources of a gigantic cerebral state, are su-
perior to those of the tiny egos confined in the miniscule city of an 
animal or even plant cell. Surely, if we were not blinded by the prej-
udice of always considering ourselves superior to everything, such 
comparisons would not be to our advantage. At root, it is this prej-
udice which prevents us from believing in the monads. In its age-
long effort to interpret everything outside us in terms of mecha-
nism, even those things which most break forth with accumulated 
signs of genius, namely living beings, our mind as it were blows 
out all the lights of the world for the sole benefit of its own little 
        26. [Trans. Note: George James Almann (1812-1898), botanist and zoologist. 
The citation has not been traced.]
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spark. Certainly Espinas27 is right to say that a small amount of in-
telligence suffices to explain the social work of bees and ants. But if 
one grants this small amount and judges it necessary to account for 
the products of these insects—which are in any case very simple, 
like the products of our industries—it must be admitted that to 
produce their organization, so infinitely superior in complexity, in 
richness, and in adaptive flexibility to all their works, a great deal 
of intelligence and many intelligences were necessary.—A remark 
naturally suggests itself at this point: Since the accomplishment of 
the simplest and most banal social function, which has persisted 
unchanged over centuries (for example, the reasonably regular co-
ordinated movement of a procession or a regiment) demands, as 
we know, so much preparatory training, so many words, so much 
effort, and so much mental force spent almost all in vain—then 
what torrents of mental or quasi-mental energy must be necessary 
to produce these complex manoeuvres of simultaneously accom-
plished vital functions, by not thousands but billions of different 
actors, all of them, we have reason to think, essentially egotistical, 
and all as different from each other as the citizens of a vast empire!
It would doubtless be necessary to reject this conclusion if it 
were proven, or had even a modicum of probability, that beyond a 
certain degree of corporeal smallness, intelligence (I do not mean 
sensory intelligence as we know it, but psyche, the genus of which 
all intelligence known to us is only a species) was impossible. If 
this impossibility were established, we could deduce that all psy-
chological phenomena are results radically different from their 
conditions, even though all intelligent beings observed by us, or 
more generally all beings which have a psyche, proceed from par-
ents or ancestors who equally have a psyche, and even though the 
spontaneous generation of intelligence is a hypothesis even less 
acceptable, if such a thing be possible, than the spontaneous gen-
eration of life. But however far we penetrate into the microscopic 
and even ultra-microscopic depths of the infinitely small, we will 
always discover living seeds and complete organisms, in which ob-
servation or induction will lead us to recognize the characteristics 
of animality as much as of vegetation, since the two kingdoms are 
indistinguishable in minimis. As Spottiswoode says: ‘A diameter 
        27. [Trans. Note: Alfred Espinas (1844-1922), sociologist. The reference is to 
his work Des Sociétés animales [Animal Societies], Paris, G. Baillière, 1877. In fact, 
Espinas’ own view of the scope of intelligence in social insects is closer to Tarde’s 
than the text may suggest.] 
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of 1/3000 millimetres is approximately the smallest that a micro-
scope allows us to see distinctly. But solar rays and electric light 
reveal to us the presence of bodies infinitely beneath these dimen-
sions. Tyndall had the idea of measuring them as a function of 
light waves … by observing a mass of them and noting the hues 
they reflected … These infinitely small bodies are not just gaseous 
molecules; they include moreover complete organisms, and the il-
lustrious scientist just cited has made a thorough study of the con-
siderable influence which these miniscule organisms exercise in 
the economy of life’.28
But, it will be objected, even if we cannot thus attain the lim-
its of the psychic, nonetheless common sense affirms that, by and 
large, beings much smaller than ourselves are much less intel-
ligent; and, following this progression, we are sure to arrive, on 
the path of increasing smallness, at the absolute absence of intel-
ligence. Common sense indeed! Common sense also tells us that 
intelligence is incompatible with excessive size and in this, it must 
be admitted, experience proves it right. But if we juxtapose these 
two commonsensical affirmations, the one unmotivated, the other 
likely, it is clear that they emerge from the prejudice of anthropo-
centrism. In reality, we judge beings to be less intelligent the less 
we understand them, and the error of thinking the unknown to be 
unintelligent goes hand in hand with the error, which we will ex-
amine below,29 of thinking the unknown to be indistinct, undif-
ferentiated, and homogenous.
The foregoing should on no account be seen as a disguised plea 
in favour of the teleological principle (principe de finalité), which is 
now so rightly discredited in its ordinary form. Perhaps, in fact, 
from a methodological point of view, it would be preferable to deny 
nature any goal and any idea than to claim, as many do, that all her 
goals and all her ideas can be linked to a single thought and will. 
This would be a curious way to explain a world where beings are 
constantly devouring each other; where, in each being, the agree-
ment of functions, to the extent that it exists at all, is nothing but a 
transaction of contrary interests and claims; where in the normal 
state, and in the most balanced individual, useless functions and 
organs can be seen, in the same way as in the best-governed State 
dissident sects will always spring up, and provincial particularities 
        28. [Trans. Note: William Spottiswoode (1825-1883), mathematician and physi-
cist. The citation has not been traced.]
        29. [Trans. Note: See chapter VI below.]
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will be religiously perpetuated by the citizens and of necessity re-
spected by the rulers, even though they disrupt the unity which 
is their dream! However infinite one may suppose thought or di-
vine will to be, if it is to be one thing, it will ipso facto become in-
adequate as an explanation of reality. Between its infinity, which 
supposes the coexistence of contradictories, and its unity, which 
demands perfect agreement, we must choose,—or else make, in a 
marvellous fashion, the one proceed from the other, each in turn, 
the latter from the former, then the former from the latter … But 
let us not become involved with such mysteries. Either there is no 
intelligence at all in matter, or matter is wholly saturated with in-
telligence; there is no middle ground. And in truth, scientifically 
speaking, it comes down to the same thing. Let us suppose for 
a moment that one of our human States, composed not of a few 
thousand but of a few quadrillions or quintillions of men, hermeti-
cally sealed and inaccessible as individuals (like China, but infi-
nitely more populous still, and more closed) was known to us only 
by the data of its statisticians, whose figures, made up of very large 
numbers, recurred with extreme regularity. When a political or 
social revolution, which would be revealed to us by an abrupt en-
largement or diminution of some of these numbers, took place in 
this State, we might well be certain that we would be observing 
a fact caused by individual ideas and passions, but we would re-
sist the temptation to become lost in superfluous conjectures on 
the nature of these impenetrable causes even though they alone 
were the real ones, and the wisest option would appear to us to 
explain as best we could the unusual numbers by ingenious com-
parisons with clever manipulations of the normal numbers. We 
would thereby arrive at least at clear results and symbolic truths. 
Nonetheless, it would be important from time to time to recall the 
purely symbolic nature of these truths; and precisely this is the 
service which the theory of monads can offer to science.
III
We have seen that science, having pulverized the universe, neces-
sarily ends up by spiritualizing the dust thus created. However, 
we now face an important objection. In any monadological or at-
omistic system, all phenomena are nebulous clouds resolvable 
into the actions emanating from a multitude of agents who are 
so many invisible and innumerable little gods. This polytheism—
this myriatheism, one might almost say—leaves unexplained the 
Monadology and Sociology26
universal agreement of phenomena, as imperfect as this may be. 
If the elements of the world are born separate, independent and 
autonomous, it is impossible to see why a great number of them 
and many of the groups formed by them (for example all atoms 
of oxygen or hydrogen) resemble each other, if not perfectly, as is 
often supposed without sufficient reason, at least within certain 
approximately fixed limits; it is impossible to see why many of 
them, if not all, appear to be captive and subjugated, and to have 
renounced the absolute liberty which their eternity implies; and 
finally, it is impossible to see why order and not disorder, and in 
first place the primary condition of order, namely increasing con-
centration rather than increasing dispersion, are the result of their 
relations. Thus it seems necessary to have recourse to new hy-
potheses. As a complement to the closure of his monads, Leibniz 
made each one a camera obscura where the whole universe of oth-
er monads is represented in a reduced form and from a particu-
lar angle; and moreover, he had to posit a pre-established harmo-
ny, in the same way that, as the complement of their wandering 
blind atoms, materialists must invoke universal laws or a single 
formula embracing all laws, a kind of mystical commandment 
which all beings would obey and which was not produced by any 
being, a kind of ineffable and unintelligible word which, having 
never been pronounced by anyone, nonetheless would be heard 
everywhere and forever. Besides, both atomists and monadolo-
gists equally represent their first elements, which they claim are 
the sources of all reality, as swimming in the same space and the 
same time, which are two realities or pseudo-realities of a singular 
kind: deeply penetrating throughout the material realities which 
were supposed impenetrable, and yet radically distinct from the 
latter, despite the intimacy of this penetration. All these charac-
teristics are so many mysteries, which create a curious embarrass-
ment for the philosopher. Is there any hope of resolving them by 
conceiving of open monads which would penetrate each other re-
ciprocally, rather than being mutually external? I believe there is, 
and I note that on this point again, the progress of science, indeed 
of modern science in general and not only of its most recent devel-
opments, favours the blossoming of a renewed monadology. The 
Newtonian discovery of gravitation, of action at a distance (and at 
any distance) of material elements on one another, shows how dif-
ficult it will be to make a case for their impenetrability. Each ele-
ment, hitherto conceived as a point, now becomes an indefinitely 
Gabriel tarde 27
enlarged sphere of action (for analogy leads us to believe that grav-
ity, like all other physical forces, is propagated successively);30 and 
all these interpenetrating spheres are so many domains proper to 
each element, so many distinct though intermixed spaces, per-
haps, which we wrongly take to be a single unique space. The cen-
tre of each sphere is a point, which is uniquely defined by its prop-
erties, but in the end a point like any other; and besides, since 
activity is the very essence of the elements, each of them exists 
in its entirety in the place where it acts. The atom, in truth, if we 
draw the implications of this point of view which is naturally sug-
gested by Newton’s law (which a few thinkers have occasionally 
tried, and failed, to explain by the pressure of the ether), ceases to 
be an atom; it is a universal medium [milieu universel] or aspires to 
become one, a universe in itself, not only, as Leibniz wished to ar-
gue, a microcosm, but the entire cosmos vanquished and absorbed 
by a single being. If, having thus resolved this rather supernat-
ural conception of space into real particular spaces or domains, 
we could in the same way resolve a single Time, that hollow en-
tity, into multiple realities and elementary desires, then the only 
remaining simplification would be to explain natural laws, the 
similarity and repetition of phenomena and the multiplication of 
similar phenomena (physical waves, living cells, social copies) by 
the triumph of certain monads who desired these laws, imposed 
these forms, subjected to their yoke and levelled with their scythe 
a people of monads thus subjugated and made uniform, although 
born free and original, all as eager (avides) as their conquerors 
to dominate and assimilate the universe.—Just as much as space 
and time, natural laws, those equally rootless and fantastical enti-
ties, would thus finally find their proper place and their point of 
application among known realities. They would all have begun, 
like our civil and political laws, by being the designs and projects 
of individuals.—Thus we would in the simplest way possible meet 
the fundamental objection made to any atomistic or monadologi-
cal attempt to resolve the continuity of phenomena into an ele-
mentary discontinuity. What do we place within the ultimate discon-
tinuity if not continuity? We place therein, as we will explain again 
below, the totality of other beings. At the basis of each thing are 
all real or possible things. 
        30. According to Laplace, the gravific fluid, to use his expression, is propagated 
successively, but with a velocity at least millions of times faster than light. In one 
place he says 50 million times, in another 100 million.
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IV
But this implies first of all that everything is a society, that every 
phenomenon is a social fact. Now, it is remarkable that science, fol-
lowing logically from its preceding tendencies, tends strangely to 
generalize the concept of society. Science tells us of animal societ-
ies (see Espinas’ excellent book on this subject31), of cellular societ-
ies, and why not of atomic societies? I almost forgot to add societ-
ies of stars, solar and stellar systems. All sciences seem destined 
to become branches of sociology. Of course, I am aware that, by a 
mistaken apprehension of the direction of this current, some have 
been led to the conclusion that societies are organisms; but the 
truth is that, since the advent of cellular theory, organisms have on 
the contrary become societies of a particular kind, fiercely exclu-
sive cities as imagined by a Lycurgus or a Rousseau, or better still, 
religious congregations of a prodigious tenacity which equals the 
majestic and invariable strangeness of their rites, an invariability 
which nonetheless does not count against their individual mem-
bers’ diversity and force of invention.
That a philosopher such as Spencer should assimilate soci-
eties to organisms32 is not surprising, and fundamentally not 
new, except perhaps for the extraordinary expenditure of imagi-
native erudition in the service of this view. But it is truly remark-
able that a highly circumspect natural scientist such as Edmond 
Perrier can see in the assimilation of organisms to societies the 
key to the mysteries of living things and the ultimate formula of 
evolution. Having said that ‘one may compare an animal or a plant 
to a populous town, in which numerous corporations flourish, and 
that blood cells are like merchants carrying with them in the liquid 
wherein they swim the complex baggage which they trade’, he adds: 
‘In the same way that we have employed every comparison fur-
nished by the degrees of consanguinity to express the relations of 
animals to each other, before supposing that they were genuinely 
related and in effect consanguineous, so the comparisons of or-
ganisms to societies and societies to organisms have recurred 
ceaselessly to the present day, without anyone seeing in these 
comparisons anything more than forms of expression. We, on 
the contrary, have arrived at the conclusion that association played 
        31. [Trans. Note: See note 27 above.]
        32. [Trans. Note: Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), philosopher. See ‘The Social 
Organism’ (1860), in Essays: Scientific, Political and Speculative, London, Williams 
and Norgate, 1868, vol. I, pp. 384-428.]
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a considerable, if not exclusive role in the gradual development of or-
ganisms’, and so on.33
It should however be noted at this point that science also in-
creasingly assimilates organisms to mechanisms, and that it low-
ers the barriers previously erected between the living and the in-
organic worlds. Why then may the molecule, for example, not be 
a society just as much as the plant or the animal? The relative 
regularity and permanence of the apparent opposition between 
phenomena of a molecular order and phenomena of a cellular 
or vital order should in no way lead us to reject this conjecture, 
if, with Cournot, we consider further that human societies pass, 
in the process of becoming civilized, from a barbaric and as it 
were organic phase to a physical and mechanical phase. In the first 
stage, all the general facts of the instinctive development of their 
genius, in their poetry, their arts, their languages, their customs 
and their laws, curiously recall the characteristics and processes 
of life; and thence they pass by degrees to an administrative, in-
dustrial, scientific, reasonable, and in a word mechanical phase, 
which by the great numbers which it has at its disposal, arranged 
in equal heaps by the statistician, gives rise to the appearance of 
economic laws or pseudo-laws, which are so analogous in many 
respects to physical laws, and particularly to the laws of statics. 
From this similarity, which is supported by a whole mass of facts, 
and for which I refer the reader to Cournot’s Treatise on the Order 
of the Fundamental Ideas,34 it follows first of all that the chasm 
between the nature of inorganic beings and the nature of living 
things is not unbridgeable (contrary to an error which Cournot 
himself makes on this point), since we see the same evolution, 
that of our societies, take on alternately the attributes of the latter 
and those of the former. It follows secondly that if a living thing 
is a society, a fortiori a purely mechanical being must also be one, 
since the progress of society consists in mechanization. A mol-
ecule would then be, compared to an organism or to a State, only 
a kind of infinitely more numerous and more advanced nation, 
arrived at the stationary period which J. S. Mill calls forth with 
all his will.35
        33. [Trans. Note: For Perrier, see note 15 above. This citation has not been traced 
(Tarde may be paraphrasing rather than citing exactly).]
        34. [Trans. Note: Cournot, Traité (note 17), section IV.1 (ed. cited pp. 296-311).]
        35. [Trans. Note: See J. S. Mill, ‘Of the Stationary State’, Principles of Political 
Economy, vol. II, book IV, ch. 6, 5th ed., London, Parker, Son & Bourn, 1862, pp. 
320-326.]
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Let us move immediately on to the most specious objection yet 
made to this assimilation of organisms, and a fortiori of physical 
things, to societies. The most striking contrast between nations 
and living bodies is that living bodies have defined and symmet-
ric contours, while the borders of nations or the walls of cities are 
drawn on the earth with a capricious irregularity which clearly 
demonstrates the absence of any pre-ordained plan. Spencer and 
Espinas have responded in different ways to this difficulty,36 but, I 
believe, there is another possible response.
The contrast cannot be denied—it is a very real one—but it 
admits of a plausible explanation; here I offer a simplified version 
of this explanation for ease of understanding. Leaving to one side 
the defined and symmetrical nature of organic forms, let us fo-
cus solely on another characteristic linked to the former, namely 
that the length, breadth and height of an organism are never in 
extreme disproportion to one another. In snakes and poplar trees, 
height or length is noticeably greater than the other dimensions; in 
flatfish the thickness is much less; but, in any case, the dispropor-
tion visible in these extreme forms cannot be likened to that con-
sistently displayed by any given social aggregate. Take for example 
China, which has a length and breadth of 3000 kilometres, but an 
average height of only 1 or 2 metres, since the Chinese are rather 
short and their buildings low. Even a mediaeval state consisting 
of a single fortified town tightly constrained within its defensive 
walls, and whose houses of several floors overhang the streets, still 
has a very small thickness compared to its horizontal extension. 
But does this latter example not put us on the trail of the desired 
solution? It is in order to better resist external attack that a city is 
fortified and agglomerated, and that floors mount up; if in mod-
ern capitals, where this huddling-up is not imposed by the insecu-
rity of the times, houses still tend to become ever taller, this is for 
a reason which often conflicts with the preceding, namely to sat-
isfy the need felt by an ever-growing number of men to participate 
in the social advantages of the greatest possible assembly of people 
in the smallest possible space. If this lively instinct of sociability 
which makes men want to agglomerate themselves, either to bet-
ter defend themselves or to develop themselves more fully, did not 
        36. [Trans. Note: Spencer’s and Espinas’ responses are in fact broadly simi-
lar, and primarily rest on questioning the presumption that the forms of organ-
isms are necessarily well-defined and symmetrical (see e.g. Spencer, ‘The Social 
Organism’, edition cited, pp. 393-394; Espinas, Les Sociétés animales, pp. 216-217).] 
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rapidly encounter an impassable limit, it is likely that we would see 
nations composed of clusters of men towering into the air, support-
ed on the earth without spreading over it. But it is hardly necessary 
to indicate why this is impossible. A nation which was as high as 
it was wide would surpass the breathable zone of the earth’s atmo-
sphere by a considerable distance, and the earth’s crust provides no 
material sufficiently solid for the titanic constructions demanded 
by such urban development in a vertical direction. Besides, beyond 
a height of a few metres, the resulting inconveniences outweigh 
the advantages, as a result of man’s physical makeup, in which all 
the senses and organs respond exclusively to the demands of hori-
zontal expansion. Man’s nature is to walk rather than climb, to see 
forwards and not up or down, and so on. Finally, the enemies he 
fears do not fly in the air but wander on the earth. In this light, it 
would be of no use to a nation to be very tall. For cellular aggregates 
such as animals or plants, the situation is otherwise. They are just 
as likely to be unexpectedly attacked from above as from the side, 
and must therefore be prepared to defend themselves in every di-
rection. Moreover, the constitution of the anatomical elements 
which make up living bodies is nowise limited to co-ordination in 
the horizontal plane. There is therefore no obstacle to the unlimit-
ed satisfaction of the sociable instincts which we see in them.
This said, do we not see that, the more a social aggregate grows 
in height at the expense of its two other dimensions, and in this 
respect diminishes the (albeit still considerable) distance which 
separates it from organic forms, the more it comes to resemble the 
latter also by its regularity and by the increasing symmetry of its 
external shape and internal structure? A large public corporation, 
a government school, a barracks, or a monastery are all so many 
highly centralized and highly disciplined small States, which con-
firm this perspective on the facts. Conversely, when an organized 
being such as a lichen on occasion takes the form of a thin layer of 
widely spread cells, it will be noted that its contours are ill-defined 
and asymmetrical.
We may discover the significance of this symmetry which, as 
a rule, is enjoyed by living forms, by another kind of consideration 
borrowed once more from our societies. In vain have theorists at-
tempted to explain this symmetry by considerations of functional 
utility. We may prove as much as we like, with Spencer, that lo-
comotion demanded that organisms pass from radial symmetry 
to bilateral symmetry, which is lesser but more perfect, and that 
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where the maintenance of symmetry was incompatible with the 
health of the individual or the perpetuation of the species (for ex-
ample in flatfish), the symmetry has been broken, in an exception 
to the general rule. But it should not be forgotten that wherever 
possible, all that could be retained of the primordial symmetry 
whence life originated (probably spherical, that is to say full and 
vague), and all that could be derived from the precise and truly 
beautiful symmetry at which life arrives in its progress, has been 
conserved or realized. Through the whole gamut of plant and ani-
mal life, from diatoms to orchids, from corals to man, the tenden-
cy towards symmetry is evident. Where does this tendency come 
from? Observe that, in our social world, everything which results 
not from a competition of intermingled plans which clash togeth-
er, but from an individual’s design executed without hindrance, 
is symmetrical and regular. Kant’s philosophical monument 
where volumes and chapters harmoniously reflect one another; 
the administrative, financial and military systems established by 
Napoleon I; the cities which the English have built in Guyana, 
with their streets drawn by ruler, meeting at right angles, end-
ing in a square surrounded by lowered porticos; our churches, 
our railway stations, and so on; everything, to repeat, which ema-
nates from a thought which is free, ambitious and strong, master 
of itself and of others, seems to obey some internal necessity in 
displaying the luxury of striking regularity and symmetry. Every 
despot has a love of symmetry; if a writer, he must have constant 
antitheses; if a philosopher, repeated dichotomies and trichoto-
mies; if a king, ceremony, etiquette, and military parades. If so, 
and if, as will be shown below, the possibility of individuals’ ex-
ecuting their plans completely and on a large scale is a sign of so-
cial progress, it follows necessarily that the symmetrical and regu-
lar nature of living things attests to the high degree of perfection 
achieved by cellular societies, and to the enlightened despotism to 
which they are subject. We should not lose sight of the fact that, 
since cellular societies are a thousand times older than human 
societies, the inferiority of the latter is hardly surprising. Besides, 
human societies are limited in their progress by the small num-
ber of men which the planet can support. The greatest empire of 
the world, China, has only 300 or 400 million subjects. An organ-
ism which contained only this number of ultimate anatomical ele-
ments would necessarily be placed towards the bottom of the scale 
of plant or animal life. 
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Having thus met the objection which draws on organic form 
to argue against the similarity of organisms to social groups, it 
behoves us to say a word about another not inconsequential ob-
jection. Some have contrasted the variability of human societies, 
even those which are slowest to change, with the relative fixity of 
organic species. But if, as can be shown, the almost exclusive cause 
of the internal differentiation of a social form should be sought in 
the extra-social relations of its members, that is, in their relations, 
either with the fauna, the flora, the soil, the atmosphere of their 
country, or with the members of foreign societies which are differ-
ently constituted, this difference is not surprising. Due to the very 
nature of its arrangement—which is entirely superficial and not vo-
luminous, almost without thickness—to the extreme dispersion of 
its elements, and to the multiplicity of intellectual and industrial 
exchanges between one people and another, the social aggregate of 
men includes an unusually low proportion of essentially conserva-
tive intra-social relations between its members, and prevents them 
from maintaining among themselves the omnilateral social rela-
tions presupposed by the globular form of a cell or an organism.
In support of the above view, we may remark that external cu-
taneous cells, which have a monopoly on the principal extra-social 
relations, are in every case the most easily modifiable. Nothing is 
more variable than the skin and its appendages; in plants, the epi-
dermis is in different cases glabrous, hairy, spiny, etc. This cannot 
be explained solely by the heterogeneity of the external environ-
ment, which is presumed to be greater than that of the internal 
environment. This latter point is not at all proven. Besides, and 
consequently, it is always the external cells which set in motion 
the variations of the rest of the organism. The proof is that the in-
ternal organs of new species, although modified to some extent 
relative to the species from which they emerge, always undergo a 
lesser modification than do the peripheral organs, and seem to be 
laggards on the path of organic progress.37
Is it necessary to point out that, in the same way, most revolu-
tions in a State are due to the internal fermentation produced by 
the introduction of new ideas which mobile populations, sailors, 
        37. To cite only one example, M C Vogt says (in 1879, at a congress of Swiss nat-
uralists, speaking of Archaeopteryx macroura, intermediate between reptiles and 
birds): ‘I believe I have proved that adaptation to flight [in reptiles in the process 
of becoming birds] works from the outside to the inside, from the skin to the skel-
eton, and that the latter can remain perfectly intact … while the skin has already 
come to develop feathers’.
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soldiers returned from campaigns in distant parts such as the 
Crusades, bring back every day from foreign lands? One would 
hardly be mistaken in seeing an organism as a jealous and closed 
city, just as the ancients dreamed.
I will pass over a number of secondary objections which the 
application of the sociological point of view may encounter along 
its way. Since, after all, the fundamental nature of things is strictly 
inaccessible, and we are obliged to construct hypotheses in order 
to penetrate it, let us openly adopt this one and push it to its con-
clusion. Hypotheses fingo, I say naively. What is dangerous in the 
sciences are not tightly linked conjectures, logically followed to the 
ultimate depths or the ultimate precipices, but rather the ghosts of 
ideas which float aimlessly in the mind. The universal sociological 
point of view seems to me to be one of these spectres which haunt 
the brains of our speculative contemporaries. Let us from the start 
see where it will lead us. Let us push ideas to their extreme, at the 
risk of being taken for extravagant. In this matter in particular, 
the fear of ridicule is the most antiphilosophical of sentiments. All 
the developments which follow will be aimed at demonstrating the 
profound renewal which the sociological interpretation must, or 
should, bring about in every domain of knowledge.
As a preamble, let us take an example at random. From our 
point of view, what is signified by the great truth that every ac-
tivity of the soul is linked to the functioning of some bodily ap-
paratus? It comes down to the fact that in a society no individual 
can act socially, or show himself in any respect, without the col-
laboration of a great number of other individuals, most of them 
unknown to him. The obscure labourers who, by the accumula-
tion of tiny facts, prepare the appearance of a great scientific the-
ory formulated by a Newton, a Cuvier, or a Darwin, compose in 
some sense the organism of which this genius is the soul; and 
their labours are the cerebral vibrations of which this theory is the 
consciousness. Consciousness means in some sense the cerebral 
glory of the brain’s most influential and powerful element. Thus, 
left to its own devices, a monad can achieve nothing. This is the 
crucial fact, and it immediately explains another, the tendency of 
monads to assemble. This tendency expresses, I believe, the need 
for a maximum of expended belief. When this maximum is at-
tained at the point of universal cohesion, then desire, now entire-
ly fulfilled, will be annihilated, and time will come to an end. Let 
us also observe that the obscure labourers I mentioned above may 
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sometimes have as much merit, erudition, and force of thought, as 
the celebrated beneficiary of their labours, or indeed even more. I 
make this remark in passing, to address the prejudice which leads 
us to judge all external monads inferior to ourselves. If the ego is 
only a director monad among the myriads of commensal monads 
in the same skull, why, fundamentally, should we believe the latter 
to be inferior? Is a monarch necessarily more intelligent than his 
ministers or his subjects?
V
This may all seem very strange, but, fundamentally, it is much less 
strange than the view which hitherto has been commonly accept-
ed among scientists and philosophers, and from which the univer-
sal sociological point of view should logically deliver us. It is truly 
surprising to see men of science, so stubborn in repeating at every 
turn that nothing is created, admit implicitly as though self-evident 
that relations between distinct beings can of themselves become new 
beings numerically added to the former. Nonetheless, this is admit-
ted, perhaps unsuspectingly, whenever, having set aside the mo-
nadic hypothesis, one tries by means of any other hypothesis, and 
in particular by the play of atoms, to account for the advent of two 
crucial beings, namely that of a new living individual, and that of 
a new ego. Unless we refuse the name of being to these two reali-
ties which are the prototypes of any concept of being, we are forced 
to admit that, as soon as a determinate number of mechanical ele-
ments enter into a certain kind of mechanical relation, a new liv-
ing thing which previously did not exist suddenly exists and is 
added to their number; more strictly, we should admit that, as 
soon as a given number of living elements find themselves drawn 
together in the desired fashion within a skull, something as real 
as, if not more real than these elements is created in their midst, 
simply in virtue of this drawing together, as if a number could be 
increased by the disposition and rearrangement of its units. The 
ordinary concept of the relation of conditions to outcome, which is 
so much abused by the natural and social sciences, conceals this 
almost mythological absurdity which I have described, but none-
theless still harbours it at its very root. Once embarked on this 
course, there is no reason to stop: every harmonious, profound 
and intimate relation between natural elements becomes the cre-
ator of a new and superior element, which in turn assists in the 
creation of another yet higher element; at every step of the scale of 
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phenomenal complexity, from the atom to the ego, via a series of 
increasingly complex molecules, then the cell or the Haeckelian 
plastidule,38 then the organ and finally the organism, there will ap-
pear as many newly created beings as newly apparent unities and, 
up to the ego, one will proceed invincibly on the path of this error 
and encounter no obstacle, since it is impossible for us to know in-
timately the true nature of the elementary relations which arise in 
systems of external elements of which we do not form a part. But a 
serious pitfall appears when we arrive at human societies; here we 
are at home, we are the true elements of these coherent systems of 
persons which we call cities or states, regiments or congregations. 
We know everything that goes on in them. Now, however intimate, 
profound, and harmonious a given social group may be, we will 
never see springing forth ex abrupto from among its members, to 
their surprise, a collective ego which is real and not only metaphori-
cal, a marvellous outcome of which these individuals would be the 
conditions. Doubtless there is always one member who represents 
and personifies the whole group, or else a small number of them 
(like the ministers of a State) who, each in a different respect, indi-
vidualize it no less entirely in themselves. But this leader or lead-
ers are always also members of the group, born from their father 
and mother and not collectively from their subjects or their sub-
ordinates. Why, then, should the agreement of unconscious brain 
cells have the gift of daily awakening from nothingness a con-
sciousness in an embryonic brain, when the agreement of human 
consciousnesses could never achieve this in a society? 
VI
Thus the extension of this most eminently lucid of points of view, 
namely the sociological, to the totality of phenomena is destined 
to radically transform the scientific concept of the relation of con-
ditions to result. In still another respect it brings about a profound 
change in this relation. The principal objection against the mo-
nadic doctrine, as stated above, is that it introduces, or appears 
to introduce, as much complexity at the base of the phenomena 
as at their summit. What, we will be asked, explains the spiritu-
al complexity of the agents by which we hope to explain all else? I 
have already met this objection by denying the hypothesized com-
plexity, if it is to be supposed that belief and desire are all there is 
        38. [Trans. Note: The plastidule, in Haeckel’s theory, is the basic molecule of 
protoplasm from which cellular organisms are built up.]
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to the monads. However, it may be posited, in my view correctly, 
that their content cannot be reduced to these two quantities alone. 
I shall shortly state what more I attribute to them. Returning to 
the stated objection, then, I shall attack it at its very source, in the 
widespread prejudice according to which the result is always more 
complex than its conditions, and the action more differentiated 
than its agents, whence it follows that universal evolution is nec-
essarily a movement from the homogenous to the heterogeneous, 
in a progressive and constant process of differentiation. Spencer 
has the merit, in particular in his chapter on the instability of the 
homogenous,39 of having magisterially formulated this belief, and 
elevated it to the status of law. The truth is that difference comes 
about by differing and that change comes about by changing and, 
in thus being given as ends to themselves, change and difference 
attest to their necessary and absolute character; but it is not and 
cannot be proven that the total amount of difference and change 
in the world is either growing or diminishing. If we look at the so-
cial world, the only one known to us from the inside, we see agents, 
men, much more differentiated and more sharply characterized as 
individuals, and richer in continual variations, than are the mech-
anisms of government or the systems of laws or of beliefs, or even 
dictionaries or grammars, and this differentiation is maintained 
by their competition. A historical fact is simpler and clearer than 
the states of mind of any of its actors. Moreover, as the popula-
tion of social groups grows and the brains of their members are 
enriched with new ideas and new sentiments, the functioning of 
their administrations, their codes of law and conduct, their cate-
chisms, and the very structure of their languages become simpler 
and more regular, rather as scientific theories become simpler as 
they are filled with more numerous and diverse facts. Our rail-
way stations are constructed to a simpler and more standardized 
form than the castles of the Middle Ages, even though the former 
draw on a much more diverse range of resources and skills. At the 
same time we see that, if the progress of civilization in certain re-
spects diversifies individual human beings, it does so only on con-
dition of levelling them in other respects by the growing unifor-
mity of their laws, their habits, their customs, and their languages. 
In general, the similarity of these collective factors encourages the 
intellectual and moral dissimilarity of individuals, and extends 
        39. [Trans. Note: Herbert Spencer, First Principles, 5th ed., London, Williams & 
Norgate, 1887, ch. 13, pp. 401-430.]
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their sphere of action; and besides, if in the course of the civi-
lizing movement, institutions, customs, clothing, industrial prod-
ucts and so on, differ much less between one point and another in a 
given territory, they differ much more from one moment to another 
in a given span of time.
As for the formula of the instability of the homogenous, it pre-
supposes that the more homogenous something is, the more un-
stable its internal equilibrium, to the extent that if it were absolute-
ly homogenous, it would be unable to subsist from one moment 
to the next. However, it is remarkable that space is the only type 
of absolute homogeneity known to us, if its reality be admitted, as 
Spencer does. How can it be, if this law holds, that this perfectly ho-
mogenous system of points and volumes has subsisted unalterably 
since the beginning of time? To be sure, this argument no longer 
holds if the reality of space be denied, but regardless, this putative 
law is contradicted by a thousand examples of relative homogene-
ity arising from heterogeneity, the most striking of which are fur-
nished by the observation of either human or animal societies. 
The aggregation of polyps, animals which are often very compli-
cated, forms a colony or polypary, an extremely rudimentary form 
of aquatic vegetable. The aggregation of men in tribes or nations 
gives birth to a language, an inferior species of plant whose his-
torical vegetation,40 growth and flourishing, to use their own expres-
sions, are studied by philosophers.
This, to repeat, is why the infusion of a sociological spirit into 
the sciences would be eminently conducive to curing them of this 
prejudice against which I have taken arms. It would then be clear 
how we should understand this great and beautiful principle of 
differentiation, which Spencer extended so successfully without, 
however, being able to reconcile it, as I believe we must, with the 
no less certain principle of universal co-ordination. The primor-
dial nebula41 appears to us shrouded in the mists of time, and it 
is perhaps due only to this distance that it displays to us the ho-
mogeneity which forms the point of departure for all cosmogonic 
theories. Do we have the least knowledge of what antecedent di-
versities were sacrificed by the condensation of the elements into 
similar atoms, of the atoms into molecules and celestial spheres, 
        40. [Trans. Note: The use of the term ‘vegetation’ (végétation) to mean growth 
or development in general is less common now than in Tarde’s time in both 
English and French.]
        41. [Trans. Note: The cloud from which the solar system coalesced.]
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of molecules into cells and so on, for the benefit of the diversi-
ties which came after them (and which were admittedly greater 
than the former, which is not to say that the one grew from the 
other)? We know a little better, but still do not fully understand, 
what it cost to a people of free and wandering savages to agglomer-
ate themselves into bands, and to bands to settle in cities, circling 
about a pivot of fixed institutions. But when, before our eyes, the 
provincial diversity of customs, of costumes, of ideas, of accents, 
and of physical forms, is being levelled by modernity, by the uni-
ty of weights and measures, of language, of accent, and even of 
conversation—a levelling which is the necessary condition for all 
these minds to come into contact with one another, that is, to be-
gin to work, and to develop more freely their individual character-
istics—then the tears of poets and of artists attest to the price of 
the social picturesqueness which has been sacrificed for the sake 
of these advantages. Are the newly created differences more con-
siderable than the old ones, in virtue of being more advantageous 
because they respond to a greater number of desires? No. We have 
an unfortunate and inexplicable tendency to imagine everything 
unknown to us as homogenous. Since the former geological states 
of the planet are much less well known to us than its current state, 
we think it certain that they were less differentiated, a prejudice 
against which Lyell frequently protests.42 Before the telescope 
which revealed to us the multiformity of nebulae, of stellar forms, 
double and variable stars, was the universal dream not of immu-
table and incorruptible heavens beyond those known to us?43 And 
in the realm of the infinitely small, which, much more than the in-
finitely large, has remained inaccessible to our observations, does 
one not still dream of the philosopher’s stone in a thousand forms, 
the identical atoms of the chemists, or the so-called homogenous 
protoplasm of the naturalists? But everywhere where a scientist 
digs beneath the indistinction which is apparent to us, he discov-
ers an unexpected treasury of distinctions. It was once thought 
that animalcula were homogenous. Ehrenberg44 examined them 
        42. [Trans. Note: Charles Lyell (1797-1875), geologist. Lyell’s ‘uniformitarian-
ism’ emphasized the identity of the basic geological laws and processes from the 
distant past to the present.]
        43. [Trans. Note: Tarde presumably has in mind Aristotelian cosmology, in 
which the heavens beyond the moon are made of a fifth element (aether), which 
is not found in the sublunary world, and which unlike the four earthly elements, 
does not admit of any change other than local motion.] 
        44. [Trans. Note: Christian Gottfried Ehrenberg (1795-1876), naturalist.]
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through the microscope, and from then on, as Perrier says, ‘the 
soul of everything he did was the belief in the equal complexity of 
all animals’, from infusoria to man. Since solids and liquids are 
more accessible to our senses than are gases, and the latter more 
accessible than is ethereal nature, we think that solids or liquids 
are more different from each other than are gases, and in physics 
we speak of ether and not of ethers (although Laplace uses this plu-
ral) as we would speak only of gas and not of gases, if the latter were 
known to us only by their physical effects—which are remarkably 
similar—to the exclusion of their chemical properties. When wa-
ter vapour crystallizes into a thousand different needles or simply 
liquefies into flowing water, does this condensation really, as we 
are inclined to think, entail an increase in the differences inherent 
in the water molecules? No; let us not forget the freedom which 
the latter formerly enjoyed in the state of gaseous dispersion, their 
movement in every direction, their impacts, and their infinitely 
varied distances. Is it then that the differences have decreased? 
Again, no: all that has happened is that one kind of difference has 
been substituted for another, that is, internal differences for mu-
tually external ones.
To exist is to differ; difference is, in a sense, the truly sub-
stantial side of things; it is at once their ownmost possession and 
that which they hold most in common. This must be our starting 
point, and we must refrain from further explaining this princi-
ple, since all things come back to it—including identity, which is 
more usually, but mistakenly, taken as the point of departure. For 
identity is only the minimal degree of difference and hence a kind 
of difference, and an infinitely rare kind, as rest is only a special 
case of movement, and the circle only a particular variety of el-
lipse. To begin from the primordial identity is to posit at the ori-
gin of things a prodigiously improbable singularity, an impossible 
coincidence of multiple beings, at once distinct from and similar 
to one another; or else the inexplicable mystery of a single simple 
being, which would subsequently, for no comprehensible reason, 
suffer division. It is to commit a similar error to that of the ancient 
astronomers who, in their chimerical explanations of the solar sys-
tem, began with the circle and not with the ellipse, on the basis 
that the former is more perfect. Difference is the alpha and omega 
of the universe; everything begins with difference, with the ele-
ments whose innate diversity (which various reasons make prob-
able) can in my view be the only justification of their multiplicity; 
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everything ends with difference, where, in the higher phenomena 
of thought and history, it finally breaks free of the narrow circles 
in which it had bound itself, namely the atomic vortex and the vital 
vortex, and transforming the very obstacle it faced into a fulcrum, 
surpasses and transfigures itself. It seems to me that all similari-
ties and all phenomenal repetitions are only intermediaries, which 
will inevitably be found to be interposed between some elementa-
ry diversities which are more or less obliterated, and the transcen-
dent diversities produced by their partial immolation.
We might also observe that every sufficiently prolonged pro-
cess of evolution exhibits a succession and interlacing of phenom-
enal layers which are remarkable alternately for the regularity and 
the caprice, the permanence and the fugacity, of the relations they 
present to us. The example of society is eminently well-suited to 
promote an awareness of this central fact, and at the same time to 
indicate its true significance, by showing that in this series where 
identity and difference, the indistinct and the well-characterized 
each reciprocally make use of the other over and over again, the 
initial and final term is always difference, the characteristic, the bi-
zarre and inexplicable agitation at the basis of all things, which re-
appears more clearly and sharply after each successive effacement. 
The speech of men, each with a different accent, intonation, and 
timbre of voice and gesture: this veritable chaos of discordant het-
erogeneities is the social element. But at length, general habits of 
language emerge from this confused Babel, and are formulated as 
grammatical laws. In their turn the latter serve, by bringing into 
relation a greater number of speakers, only to throw into relief the 
particular individual turn taken by their ideas: another kind of dis-
cord. And they succeed all the more in the diversification of minds 
to the extent that they are themselves more fixed and uniform. 
Take poets, for example. When a language is newly born, they take 
hold of it and bend it to their disordered fantasy. However, after 
a certain period of babbling, rhythms and prosodic laws are for-
mulated and imposed; and this takes place in all poetries, be they 
Hindu, Greek or French. Uniformity appears anew. What purpose 
does it serve? To better unfold the poets’ imaginative resources 
and to add lustre to each one’s individual hue. In proportion to 
the growing regularity of the rhythmical beating, as it were, of the 
wings of poetry, its flight paradoxically becomes more capricious. 
Victor Hugo’s prosody with its subtle rules is at once more com-
plex and more rigorous than Racine’s. We could equally well have 
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considered scientists rather than poets, and the observation would 
have led to the same results. Each scientist works apart from the 
others, although he utilizes their work, thanks to their common 
language; he puts his temperament, his soul, into the research he 
undertakes; all is defined, all is individual.
If we could gather in a single place all the researchers who are 
collectively constructing a science at an early stage of its develop-
ment (organic chemistry, for example, meteorology, or linguistics), 
there could be no more bizarre pandemonium than this scientif-
ic furnace. And yet in this furnace an impersonal monument is 
forged,45 an edifice in glacial grey, where the least trace of the mul-
ticoloured psychological states which built it seems to have been 
absolutely erased. But let us pause for a moment. Science itself is 
certainly not the last word in progress. Let us imagine it finished, 
complete, and condensed into a definitive catechism which could 
easily be installed in a corner of everyone’s memory; in this way 
a vastly greater quantity of energy than we can presently imag-
ine would be made available in the human brain for other uses. It 
would then become clear that the perfect systematization and uni-
versal propagation of scientific orthodoxy had had for its ultimate 
and supreme rationale the extraordinary flourishing of hypothe-
ses, of philosophical heresies, of an endless series of self-invented 
systems, and of extraordinary lyrical and dramatic fantasies, in 
which, thanks to the impersonality of scientific knowledge, each 
mind’s profound need to universalize its particular nuance and 
to set its seal upon the world could be fully satisfied. Intelligence 
followed to its logical conclusion will in the end be nothing more 
than the handmaiden of imagination.
Shall we consider social evolution in its economic, adminis-
trative, or military aspect? We will again observe the same law. 
Industry, from a primitive phase where each does whatsoever and 
howsoever he likes, evolves rapidly to a second phase where pro-
fessions and corporations are established, with their fixed and tra-
ditional processes of manufacture which seem created to stifle ge-
nius, which would be nothing but a useless encumbrance; but on 
the contrary, by this very constraint, the genius of inventions and 
of arts is fortified and emerges incomparably more fecund than 
before. Commerce, from a primitive phase with no fixed or gener-
al prices, requiring perpetual haggling, and favouring individual 
        45. [Trans. Note: Reading se forge with the 1893 text; the 1895 text has se forme 
(takes shape).] 
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shrewdness and cunning, evolves to produce the uniform and reg-
ulated course of our great modern markets, provided with their 
special thermometers known as stock exchanges; and in the end, 
far from crushing individual skill beneath the authority of num-
ber, the regularity and almost physical inevitability of the over-
all economic facts support the unbridled impulse to speculation 
and the spirit of enterprise which take hold of these facts and play 
upon them, and in which the least psychological particularities of 
the players break forth lawlessly in sudden triumphs or catastro-
phes. The incoherence and administrative quirks of a nation in its 
embryonic state are gradually replaced by unity, stable administra-
tion and centralized power, all to the greater glory of statesmen, 
who are the operators of this machine and make use of it to ac-
complish their historic deeds, each one sui generis like its author, a 
marvellous accident of planetary forces. Finally, the indisciplined 
hordes of barbarian societies are superseded by our fine mecha-
nized armies, in which the individual is nothing but a tool in the 
hands of a great captain who throws him into some battle dissimi-
lar to every other, with its own name and date, reproducing on the 
vastly enlarged scale of the battlefield the particular psychological 
state which is his during the action. 
It can thus be seen from these examples that, strangely 
enough, order and simplicity are manifest in the composite even 
though foreign to its elements, and then once more disappear in 
the higher composites, and so on up the scale. But in the case 
of social evolutions and social aggregations, of which we form a 
part and where we have the advantage of being able to grasp at the 
same time the two ends of the chain, the lowest and the highest 
stones of the edifice, we can clearly see that order and simplicity 
are simply mediating terms, alembics in which elementary diver-
sity is potently transfigured and, as it were, sublimated. The poet 
and the philosopher essentially, and secondarily the inventor, the 
artist, the speculator, the politician, and the tactician: these are 
the terminal flowers of any national tree;46 their blossoming de-
pends upon the work of all the aborted germs of innate, extra-
social (or in some cases anti-social) characteristics, which every 
        46. I do not at all mean to place all of these on the same level. Among other 
differences, one may harbour hopes or dreams of a life of perfected civilization, 
when everyone would have his own poetry and his own philosophy, but one can-
not imagine a life where everyone had his own great discovery, his own grand 
prize in the lottery, or his own political or military role. 
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private citizen brought with him into the world, and which in most 
cases were stifled in the cradle by education, that indispensable 
but false leveller.
These innate characteristics, the first term of the social series, 
are at the same time the last term of the vital series. In attempting 
to reascend the latter in its turn, we would traverse first of all the 
specific form, harmoniously constituted and regularly repeated 
over centuries, whose variations these characteristics are,—then 
the critical period in which this form was shaped by a coincidence 
of multiple causes in unexpected juxtapositions,—then the previ-
ous forms whence the specific form derives and their analogous 
formations,—then the cell, and finally the formless or protean pro-
toplasm, with its sudden whims which no law may grasp.—Here 
again the alpha and the omega is diversity, in all its vividness.
But is the protoplasm, the first term of the vital series, not also 
the final term of the chemical series? The latter, if we reascend it 
in its turn, displays the less and less complex molecular forms of 
organic chemistry, and the similarly less and less complex molec-
ular forms of inorganic chemistry, all regularly constructed and 
probably consisting of harmonious cycles of periodic rhythmical 
movements, but each separated from the others by tumultuous 
and disordered crises of their combinations; and thus we arrive 
by conjecture at the simplest atom or atoms, from which all the 
others are built. But is this, then, the initial element? No. For the 
simplest atom is a material form, a vortex, as we are told, a vibra-
tory rhythm of a certain kind, something by all appearances infi-
nitely complex. This complexity has been confirmed more than 
ever by the studies of highly rarefied gases conducted since the in-
vention of the radiometer, in which it seems to be possible to see 
the gaseous atom individually. For example, in this ultra-gaseous 
world, a ray of light does not always travel in a straight line;47 the 
closer we approach to the individual element, the more variable 
the observed phenomena. Clerk Maxwell has established that the 
molecules in the same gas move with very different speeds, even 
        47. [Trans. Note: For this finding, see W. Crookes (1879) ‘On the illumina-
tion of lines of molecular pressure, and the trajectory of molecules’, Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London, no. 175, pp.135-164. The ‘ultra-gaseous’ 
or ‘radiant matter’ state refers to matter in an extreme state of rarefaction, where 
each molecule is ‘allowed to obey its own motions or laws without interference’, 
and can be seen as an individual rather than part of an ‘aggregate’ (W. Crookes 
(1880) ‘On a fourth state of matter’, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, no. 
30, pp. 469-472. William Crookes (1832-1919), chemist and physicist.]
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though their average speed may be identical.48 Spottiswoode, of 
the Royal Society of London, says: ‘This is because the simplicity 
of nature as we currently understand it is in reality the result of an 
infinite complexity, and because, beneath the appearance of unifor-
mity, we find a diversity whose depths and secrets we have not begun 
to fathom’.49 Crookes expresses himself similarly with relation to 
radiant matter: ‘The greatest problems of the future will find their 
solution in this unexplored domain [of the infinitely small], where 
doubtless the fundamental, subtle, marvellous and profound realities 
are to be found’.50 Would he so express himself if he regarded the 
ultimate elements, in the vulgar fashion, as identical exemplars of 
an unvarying form? Because every chemical substance translates 
itself to our eyes by a special vibration imprinted on the ether, one 
is led to believe that this faculty of vibrating in a certain way is 
identical in every similar atom and that they have no other proper-
ties. It is as if one said of a grove of pines or poplars, heard at a dis-
tance and recognized by its particular whisper or murmur, simple 
and monotonous, that the leaves of the pine or the poplar consist 
of a characteristic and invariable quivering. Thus, as with society, 
as with life, chemistry appears to bear witness to the necessity of 
universal difference, the principle and end of all hierarchies and 
all developments.
Diversity, and not unity, is at the heart of things: this conclu-
sion, in any case, follows for us from a general remark which a 
simple glance at the world and at the sciences allows us to make. 
Everywhere an exuberant richness of unheard-of variations and 
modulations springs forth from these permanent themes which 
are called living species and stellar systems, and from equilibria of 
all kinds, and in the end destroys and renews them utterly, and yet 
in no case do the forces or laws which we are used to calling prin-
ciples have variety as a term or as their goal. Forces, we are told, 
exist to serve laws, and all laws apply to phenomena to the extent 
that the latter are perfect repetitions and not repetitions with vari-
ations; all laws manifestly tend to ensure the exact reproduction 
of the themes and the indefinitely prolonged stability of all kinds 
of equilibria, and to prevent their alteration or renewal. The great 
crankshaft of our solar system is made in order to turn eternally. 
        48. [Trans. Note: James Clerk Marxwell (1831-1879), physicist. The reference is 
to his statistical description of gas kinetics (the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution).] 
        49. [Trans. Note: The citation has not been traced.]
        50. [Trans. Note: W. Crookes, the citation has not been traced.]
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The doubts which might have persisted on this point after Laplace 
were dispelled by Le Verrier.51 Every living species wants to perpet-
uate itself endlessly; something in it struggles to maintain its ex-
istence against everything which endeavours to dissolve it. In this 
respect it is like a government, or like the most precarious min-
istry whose essential role is always to proclaim, believe and wish 
that it is installed in power for all eternity. There is no long-extinct 
plant or animal species, now extant only as a fossil, which did not 
once embody a legislative assurance, an apparently well-founded 
certainty of living as long as the Earth. All these things which have 
passed away were once called to endless life, supported by physi-
cal, chemical, and vital laws, as our despots and our ministers by 
their code of laws and by their army. Our solar system too will 
doubtless perish, like so many others whose wreckage is visible 
in the skies; and indeed, who knows if the molecular forms them-
selves will not disappear, having come into existence in the course 
of the ages at the expense of those which preceded them?
But how can all of this have died, or how could it die? How, if 
there is in the universe nothing but supposedly immutable and 
all-powerful laws aiming at stable equilibria, and a supposedly im-
mutable substance to which these laws apply, how could the action 
of these laws on this substance produce this magnificent flourish-
ing of varieties which rejuvenates the universe at every moment, 
and this series of unexpected revolutions which transfigure it? 
How could the least ornament creep into these austere rhythms 
and enliven even a little the eternal psalmody of the world? From 
the marriage of the monotonous and the homogenous what could 
be born but tedium? If everything comes from identity, aims at 
identity and returns to identity, what is the source of this dazzling 
torrent of variety? We may be certain that the fundamental nature 
of things is not as poor, as drab, or as colourless as has been sup-
posed. Forms are only brakes and laws are only dykes erected in 
vain against the overflowing of revolutionary differences and civ-
il dissensions, in which the laws and forms of tomorrow secretly 
take shape, and which, in spite of the yokes upon yokes they bear, 
in spite of chemical and vital discipline, in spite of reason, in spite 
        51. [Trans. Note: Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749-1827, mathematician and astrono-
mer) was instrumental in developing a mechanical theory of the stability of the 
solar system. Urbain Le Verrier’s (1811-1877) prediction of the planet Neptune 
(1846) and its subsequent discovery by observation provided further confirma-
tion of Laplace’s model.]
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of celestial mechanics, will one distant day, like the people of a na-
tion, sweep away all barriers and from their very wreckage con-
struct the instrument of a still higher diversity. 
Let us insist on this central truth: we may approach it by re-
marking that, in all great regular mechanisms—the social mecha-
nism, the vital mechanism, the stellar mechanism, or the molec-
ular mechanism—all the internal revolts which in the end break 
them apart are provoked by a similar condition: their constitutive 
elements, the soldiers of these diverse regiments, the temporary 
incarnation of their laws, always belong only by one aspect of their 
being to the world they constitute, and by other aspects escape 
it. This world would not exist without them; without the world, 
conversely, the elements would still be something. The attributes 
which each element possesses in virtue of its incorporation into its 
regiment do not form the whole of its nature; it has other tenden-
cies and other instincts which come to it from its other regimen-
tations; and, moreover (we will shortly see the necessity of this 
corollary), still others which come to it from its basic nature, from 
itself, from its own fundamental substance which is the basis of 
its struggle against the collective power of which it forms a part. 
This collective is wider but no less deep than the element, but it is 
a merely artificial being, a composite made up of aspects and fa-
çades of other beings.—This hypothesis can easily be verified in 
the case of social elements. If they were only social, and in partic-
ular only national, it would follow that societies and nations would 
exist without change for all eternity. But, in spite of our great debt 
to the social and national environment, it is clear that we do not 
owe everything to it. At the same time as being French or English, 
we are mammals, and as such there circulate in our blood not only 
the germs of social instincts which predispose us to imitate our 
peers, to believe what they believe and want what they want, but 
also the seeds of non-social instincts, including some which are 
anti-social. Surely, if society had made us in our entirety, it would 
have made us entirely sociable. It is therefore from the depths of 
organic life (and from deeper still, we believe) that there wells up 
among our cities this magma of discord, hatred and envy, which 
on occasion submerges them. It is hardly possible to enumerate 
all the States overthrown by sexual love, all the cults it has under-
mined or denatured, all the languages it has corrupted, and also 
all the colonies it has founded, all the religions it has ameliorated 
and made gentle, all the barbaric idioms it has civilized, all the 
Monadology and Sociology48
arts whose life-blood it has been! Rebellion and rejuvenation in-
deed spring from a single source. In truth, all that is truly social is 
the imitation of one’s compatriots and ancestors,52 in the broadest 
sense of the term.
If the elements of societies are vital in nature, the organic ele-
ments of living bodies are chemical. One of the errors of the older 
physiology was to think that as soon as they enter into an organ-
ism, chemical substances abdicate all their properties and are pen-
etrated to their innermost heart, to their most secret core, by the 
mysterious influence of life. Our contemporary physiologists have 
entirely dispelled this error. A molecule which forms part of an or-
ganic body, therefore, belongs at once to two worlds which are for-
eign or hostile to one another. Can it be denied that this indepen-
dence of the chemical nature of corporeal elements with respect 
to their organic nature helps to explain the perturbations, the de-
viations and the fortunate recastings of living forms? Indeed, it 
seems to me that we must go yet further and recognize that only 
this independence can account for the resistance of some parts of 
the organs to the acceptance of the inherited living form, and for 
the necessity which sometimes obliges life (that is, the collection 
of molecules which have remained obedient) to finally come to a 
compromise with the rebellious faction of molecules by adopting 
a new form. In effect, then, the only truly vital process seems to 
be generation (of which nutrition and cellular regeneration are only 
special cases), in conformity with the hereditary form.
Is this the final word? Perhaps not; the analogy suggests that 
chemical and astronomical laws themselves are not supported on 
nothingness, but that their domain of application is populated by 
tiny beings already endowed with inner characters and innate di-
versities, diversities which are in no way accommodated to the par-
ticularities of the celestial or chemical machinery. It is true that we 
cannot perceive in chemical bodies the trace of any accidental ail-
ment or deviation which we could see as parallel to organic disor-
ders or social revolutions. But, since there do currently exist chem-
ical heterogeneities, there doubtless existed, in some far distant 
era, chemical formations. Were these formations simultaneous? 
Did hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, etc., appear at the same instant in 
the heart of a single amorphous substance which was previously 
        52. In progressive societies, it is increasingly one’s compatriots rather than 
one’s ancestors who are imitated, and the converse in stationary societies. But to 
associate always and everywhere means to assimilate, that is, to imitate.
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non-chemical? If this is judged improbable, or rather impossible, 
we must admit that an originary atomic form transmitted through 
vibration, starting from a point—that of hydrogen, for example—
imposed itself throughout the whole or almost the whole of ma-
terial extension, and that, by breaking away in succession from 
the primordial hydrogen, at long intervals of time, all the other 
so-called simple bodies—whose atomic weights, as we know, are 
often exact multiples of that of hydrogen—were formed. But how 
can we explain such fission on the hypothesis that the primitive el-
ements are perfectly homogenous and governed by the same law, 
which, it seems to me, should rather consolidate by the identity of 
their structure the identity and immutability of their nature? Will 
it perhaps be argued that the accidents of astronomical evolution 
involving the primitive elements could have produced or catalysed 
chemical formations? Unfortunately this hypothesis seems to me 
to have been very clearly ruled out by the discovery of the spectro-
scope. Since, according to this instrument, all the so-called simple 
bodies or many of them enter into the composition of the most dis-
tant planets and stars, which have evolved independently of each 
other, common sense tells us that the simple bodies were formed 
before the stars, as cloth before clothes. It follows that the piece-
meal dismembering of the primitive substance admits of only one 
explanation: namely, that the particles were originally dissimi-
lar, and that their schisms were caused by this essential dissim-
ilarity. There is thus some reason to think that hydrogen, for ex-
ample, as it exists today after so many successive eliminations or 
emigrations, is noticeably different from the ur-hydrogen, which 
would have been a pell-mell of discordant atoms. The same obser-
vation applies to all the simple bodies which were subsequently 
engendered. In being thus exhausted and reduced, each was con-
solidated in its equilibrium, and fortified by its very losses. But, if 
so, it is highly improbable, despite the extraordinary stability thus 
acquired by the oldest atomic or molecular forms, that complete 
similarity obtains among the elements which subsist in each. It 
would have sufficed, for the refining of each form to come to an 
end, if the internal differences of its elements had diminished to a 
point where it was no longer impossible for the elements to coex-
ist. These infinitesimal citizens of mysterious cities are so distant 
from us53 that it is no wonder that the noise of their internal dis-
        53. I say distant from us, not only by the incommensurable distance between 
their smallness and our relative immensity, and, conversely, between their relative 
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cord does not reach us, and their internal differences, if they exist 
as I believe, must be of a fineness which cannot be apprehended by 
our gross instruments. However, the polymorphism of certain el-
ements is a sufficient indicator that they harbour dissidences, and 
we know enough of these to have some suspicion of the troubles 
and disparities which afflict the fundamental nature of the princi-
pal substances employed by life, in particular carbon. How can it 
be admitted that the atoms of a single substance bond with each 
other so as to form what Gerhardt calls hydrogen hydride, chlo-
rine chloride, etc., while persisting in elevating to the status of 
dogma the perfect similarity of the multiple atoms of a single sub-
stance? Does not such a union presuppose a difference of at least 
an equal magnitude to the sexual difference which allows two in-
dividuals of a single species to unite intimately, and without which 
they could only bump together?
If we observe that the element in which these unions of atom 
to similar atom have been most clearly demonstrated to be proba-
ble, and indeed almost certain, namely carbon, is also the element 
which manifests itself to us in its pure state in the most varied as-
pects, diamond, graphite, coal, etc., the preceding induction will 
be confirmed. It is no surprise that the body most fertile in variet-
ies reveals most clearly the vigorous marriages between its constit-
uent atoms … Carbon is the differentiated element par excellence.
Wurtz says: ‘The affinity of carbon for carbon is the cause of 
the infinite variety and the immense number of the combinations 
of carbon; it is the raison d’être of organic chemistry. No other ele-
ment possesses to the same degree this master-property of carbon, 
this faculty which its atoms have of combining with one another, 
of fastening onto one another, of forming this framework, so vari-
able in its form, its dimensions, its solidity, and which serves, as it 
were, as the basis of other materials’.54
After carbon, the bodies which have to the greatest degree this 
capacity for being partially or entirely saturated by themselves are 
oxygen, hydrogen and nitrogen; remarkably enough, exactly those 
substances utilized by life!
Besides, one significant fact should give us pause for reflec-
tion: life began on this globe at a particular time and in a particular 
apparent eternity and our brief duration (a very strange and perhaps imaginary 
contrast), but also by the profound heterogeneity of their inner nature and ours.
        54. [Trans. Note: Adolphe Wurtz (1817-1884), chemist. The citation has not 
been traced.]
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place. Why at this place and not elsewhere, if the same substanc-
es were composed of the same elements? Let us even admit that 
life is only a particular, highly complex chemical combination. 
Nonetheless, how could it have been born, if not from an element 
unlike all the others?
VII
In the two preceding chapters, we have shown that the universal 
sociological point of view may be of service to science in two ways, 
by liberating it, first, from those hollow entities brought about by 
misunderstanding the relation of conditions to result, and then 
mistakenly substituted for the real agents; and second, from the 
prejudiced belief in the perfect similarity of these elementary 
agents. These two advantages are, however, purely negative; I will 
now try to show what more positive information we can gain by 
the same method regarding the inner nature of the elements. It is 
not enough to say that the elements are diverse, we must specify 
in what their diversity consists. This will demand several develop-
ments of our theory.
What is society? It could be defined, from our point of view, 
as each individual’s reciprocal possession, in many highly varied 
forms, of every other. Unilateral possession, such as that in an-
cient law of the slave by the master, of the son by the father, or of 
the wife by the husband, is only a first step towards the social link. 
Thanks to the development of civilization, the possessed becomes 
more and more a possessor, and the possessor a possessed, until, 
by equality of right, by popular sovereignty, and by the equitable 
exchange of services, ancient slavery, now mutualized and univer-
salized, makes each citizen at once the master and the servant of 
every other. At the same time, the ways of possessing one’s fellow 
citizens, and of being possessed by them, grow in number every 
day. Every new administration or industry which is created sets to 
work new administrators or industrialists on behalf of those who 
are administered by them or who consume their products, and 
who in this sense gain a real right with respect to them, a right 
which they did not previously have, while they themselves con-
versely have come, by this new two-sided relation, to belong to these 
industrialists or administrators. We may say the same of any new 
opportunity. When a newly opened railway brings produce from 
the sea to a small town far inland for the first time, the domain 
of the town’s inhabitants has grown to include the fishermen who 
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are now part of it, and the clientele of the fishermen, correspond-
ingly, has grown to include the townspeople. As a subscriber to a 
newspaper, I possess my journalists, who possess their subscrib-
ers. I possess my government, my religion, my police force, just as 
much as my specifically human form, my temperament, and my 
health; but I also know that the ministers of my nation, the priests 
of my confession or the police officers of my county count me as 
one of the flock they guard; and in the same way, the human form, 
if it were somehow personified, would see in me only one of its 
particular variations.
All philosophy hitherto has been based on the verb Be, the 
definition of which was the philosopher’s stone, which all sought 
to discover. We may affirm that, if it had been based on the verb 
Have, many sterile debates and fruitless intellectual exertions 
would have been avoided. From this principle, I am, all the sub-
tlety in the world has not made it possible to deduce any existence 
other than my own: hence the negation of external reality. If, how-
ever, the postulate I have is posited as the fundamental fact, both 
that which has and that which is had are given inseparably at once.
If having seems to indicate being, being surely implies hav-
ing. Being, that hollow abstraction, is never conceived except as 
the property of something, of some other being, which is itself 
composed of properties, and so on to infinity. At root, the whole 
content of the concept of being is exhausted by the concept of hav-
ing. But the converse is not true: being is not the whole content of 
the idea of property.
The concrete and substantial concept which one discovers in 
oneself is, therefore, that of having. Instead of the famous cogito 
ergo sum, I would prefer to say: I desire, I believe, therefore I have. 
The verb to be means in some cases to have, and in others to be 
equal to. ‘My arm is hot’: the heat of my arm is the property of my 
arm. Here is means has. ‘A Frenchman is a European, a metre is a 
measure of length’. Here is means is equal to. But this equality it-
self is only the relation of part to whole, of genus to species or vice 
versa, that is, a kind of relation of possession. In these two mean-
ings, therefore, being is reducible to having.
If one wishes to forcibly draw from the concept of Being im-
plications which are precluded by its essential sterility, one has 
to put it in opposition to non-being, and grant to the latter term 
(which is nothing but an empty objectification of our faculty of de-
nial, as Being is an objectification of our faculty of affirmation) a 
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wholly unwarranted importance.—In this respect, the Hegelian 
system can be considered the last word in the philosophy of Being. 
Embarked on this path, one will have to concoct impenetrable, and 
basically contradictory, concepts of becoming and disappearance, 
the old empty pap of Teutonic ideologues.55 By contrast, nothing 
could be clearer than the concepts of gain and loss, of acquisition 
and divestment, which take this place in the philosophy of Having, 
if we may thus name something which does not yet exist. Between 
being and non-being there is no middle term, whereas one can 
have more or less.
Being and non-being, ego and non-ego: barren oppositions 
which obscure the real correlatives. The true opposite of the ego is 
not the non-ego but the mine; the true opposite of being, that is of 
having, is not non-being but what is had.
The deep and accelerating divergence between the course of 
science strictly speaking and that of philosophy comes from the 
fact that the former, happily, has chosen for its guide the verb 
Have. For science, everything is explained by properties, not by en-
tities. Science disdains the unsatisfactory relation of substance to 
phenomenon, two empty terms which only are only the doubles of 
Being; it makes only moderate use of the relation of cause to ef-
fect, in which possession appears in only one of its two forms, and 
the less important, namely possession by desire. But science has 
made considerable use and, unfortunately, abuse of the relation of 
proprietor56 to property. The abuse has consisted primarily in hav-
ing misunderstood this relation by failing to see that the real prop-
erty of any proprietor is a set of other proprietors; that each mass, 
each molecule of the solar system, for example, has for its physical 
and mechanical property not words like extension, mobility and 
so on, but all the other masses, all the other molecules; that each 
atom of a molecule has for its chemical property, not atomicities or 
        55. [Trans. Note: In Hegel’s logic, the ‘disappearance’ (Verschwinden) of being 
into non-being and vice versa generates ‘becoming’ (Werden) (Science of Logic, vol 
1, book 1, sec 1, ch 1.C.1, ‘Unity of Being and Nothing’).]
        56. [Trans. Note: Tarde’s concept of ‘property’ (propriété) is deliberately ambig-
uous between the sense of ‘goods owned’ and the sense of ‘characteristic’ or ‘qual-
ity’. The term ‘proprietor’ (propriétaire) is standard in both French and English for 
a person who has a property in the first sense, but not in the second. In English-
language analytic philosophy, ‘instance’ is sometimes used to describe an entity 
which has a property in the second sense (which ‘instantiates’ the property), but 
this brings with it an implicit ontology of properties which is incompatible with 
Tarde’s; I have therefore retained the term ‘proprietor’. The theory of properties is 
discussed further in the Afterword.]
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affinities, but all the other atoms of the same molecule; that each 
cell of an organism has for its biological property, not irritability, 
contractibility, innervation, and so on, but all the other cells of the 
same organism, and in particular, of the same organ. Here pos-
session is reciprocal, as in every intra-social relation; but it can be 
unilateral, as in the extra-social relation of master to slave, or of the 
farmer to his cattle. For example, the retina has for its property, 
not vision, but the luminously vibrating ethereal atoms, which do 
not possess it; and the mind possesses mentally all the objects of 
its thought, to which it in no way belongs. Is this to say that the ab-
stract terms, mobility, density, weight, affinity, and so on, express 
nothing and correspond to nothing? They mean, I think, that be-
yond the real domain of every element, there is its conditionally 
necessary domain, that is certain although unreal, and that the an-
cient distinction between the real and the possible, in a new sense, 
is not a chimera.
The elements are, certainly, agents as much as they are pro-
prietors; but they can be proprietors without being agents, and 
they cannot be agents without being proprietors. Moreover, their 
action can be revealed to us only as a change in the nature of 
their possession.
On closer investigation, it will be seen that the sole cause of 
the superiority of the scientific point of view over the philosoph-
ical point of view is the fortunate choice of fundamental rela-
tion adopted by scientists, and that all the remaining obscurities 
and weaknesses of science spring from the incomplete analysis 
of this relation.
For thousands of years, thinkers have catalogued the different 
ways of being and the different degrees of being, and have never 
thought to classify the different types and degrees of possession. 
Possession is, nonetheless, the universal fact, and there is no bet-
ter term than acquisition to express the formation and growth of 
any being. The terms correspondence and adaptation,57 brought 
into fashion by Darwin and Spencer, are more vague and equivo-
cal, and grasp the universal fact only from the outside. Is it true 
that the bird’s wing is adapted to air, the fish’s fin to water, the eye 
to light? No, no more than the locomotive is adapted to coal, or the 
        57. [Trans. Note: ‘Adaptation’ refers to Darwin’s concept of the process through 
which a population becomes better suited to its environment through natural se-
lection. Herbert Spencer developed Darwin’s idea by seeing adaptation as a pro-
cess of increasing ‘correspondence’ between the organism and its environment.]
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sewing machine to the seamstress’ thread. Shall we also say that 
the vasomotor nerves, the ingenious mechanism by which the in-
ternal equilibrium of the body’s temperature is maintained de-
spite variations in the external temperature, are adapted to these 
variations? Fighting against would be a curious form of adapting 
to! The locomotive is adapted, if you will, to terrestrial locomo-
tion, and the wing to aerial locomotion, and this comes down to 
saying that the wing utilizes the air to move, as the locomotive 
uses coal, as the fin uses water. Does this using not mean tak-
ing possession? Every being wants, not to make itself appropriate 
for external beings, but to appropriate them for itself. Atomic or 
molecular bonding58 in the physical world, nutrition in the living 
world, perception in the intellectual world, law in the social world, 
possession in its innumerable forms never ceases to extend from 
a being to other beings, by the interlacing of various and increas-
ingly subtle domains.
It is variable in its infinite degrees as well as in its multiple 
forms. Stars, for example, possess each other with an intensity 
which grows or shrinks in inverse proportion to the square of their 
distance. The vitality of organisms, that is the intimate solidarity 
of their parts, rises or falls continuously. From deepest sleep to the 
most perfect clarity of mind, thought ranges over a wide gamut 
which marks the growth of its special dominion over the world. 
When security is re-established in a country which has been sub-
ject to great upheavals, does each citizen not still feel himself to be 
master of those of his compatriots from whom he has the right to 
expect some service—that is to say, of all his compatriots—and on 
whose legitimate help he relies more strongly than before?
Whatever form possession takes, be it physical, chemical, 
vital, mental, or social (not to speak of the subdivisions of each 
form), we must first distinguish whether it is unilateral or recipro-
cal, and second, whether it is established between an element and 
one or more other elements considered individually, or between 
an element and an indistinct group of other elements. Let us first 
speak briefly of this second distinction. When I enter into verbal 
communication with one or several of my fellows, our respective 
monads, in my view, reciprocally grasp each other; at least, it is 
certain that this relation is the relation of a social element with 
other social elements that are taken as distinct. By contrast, when 
        58. [Trans. Note: Tarde uses the term ‘adhesion’ (adhérence), but appears to have 
the more general concept of ‘bonding’ in mind.]
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I look at, listen to, or study nature, rocks, water, or even plants, 
each object of my thought is a hermetically closed world of ele-
ments, which all doubtless know each other or grasp each other 
intimately, like the members of a social group, but which can be 
encompassed by me only as a whole and from the outside. The 
chemist can only hypothesize the atom, and is certain of never 
being able to act on it individually. Matter, as the chemist under-
stands and uses the concept, is a compact dust of distinct atoms, 
whose distinctions are effaced by their enormous number and by 
the illusory continuity of their actions. In the living but inanimate, 
or apparently inanimate, world, can our monad find some less con-
fused phantom, and grasp it? It seems it can. The element, already, 
intuits the element; the girl who tends a flower loves it with a devo-
tion which no diamond could inspire in her.
We must, however, look to the social world to see monads laid 
bare, grasping each other in the intimacy of their transitory char-
acters, each fully unfolded before the other, in the other, by the 
other. This is the relation par excellence, the paradigm of posses-
sion of which all others are only sketches or reflections. By per-
suasion, by love and hate, by personal prestige, by common beliefs 
and desires, or by the mutual chain of contract, in a kind of tightly 
knit network which extends indefinitely, social elements hold each 
other or pull each other in a thousand ways, and from their com-
petition the marvels of civilization are born.
Are not the marvels of organization and life born from a simi-
lar action, from vital element to vital element, and doubtless from 
atom to atom? I am inclined to think so, for reasons which it would 
take too long to explain here. Must it not be likewise for chemical 
creations and for astronomical formations? Newtonian attraction 
surely acts from one atom to another, since the most complicated 
chemical operations do not alter it at all. 
In that case, the possessive action of monad upon monad, of 
element upon element, would be the only truly fertile relation. 
As for the action of a monad, or at least of an element, on a con-
fused group of indiscriminate monads or elements, or conversely, 
it would only be an accidental perturbation of the wonderful works 
wrought by the elements’ duel or by their marriage. As much as 
the relation of element to element is creative, so the relation of ele-
ment to group is destructive, but both are necessary.
Unilateral possession and reciprocal possession are, likewise, 
necessarily united. But the latter is superior to the former. It is 
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reciprocal possession which explains the formation of those beau-
tiful celestial mechanisms in which, by the power of mutual at-
traction, every point is a centre. Reciprocal possession explains the 
creation of these admirable living organisms whose parts are all 
united and solidary, and where everything is both an end and a 
means at once. By reciprocal possession, finally, in the free cities 
of antiquity and in modern states, mutuality of service and equal-
ity of right bring about the prodigious achievements of our scienc-
es, industries, and arts. Let us observe that, if organized beings 
resulted from a process of fabrication by a single being, or from 
the regular differentiation of a single homogenous substance, it 
would be impossible to account for our surprising ability to see 
the parts of these beings as made for the whole, or the whole as 
made for the parts. Beings, or rather manufactured objects, would 
be, with respect to the manufacturer, that which our furniture or 
tools are to us: mere means, which no sophistical juggling will 
ever disguise as ends with respect to our acts. As for the unique 
substance which, some think, creates particular beings by sponta-
neously splitting itself, it is impossible to see why, first, if it carried 
no goal within itself, it would have emerged from its primitive un-
differentiated state; nor, secondly, why, prior to any differentiation, 
alone in the world, it took a roundabout way to attain its goal rather 
than going straight there, used a means instead of grasping its end 
directly, and preferred the tortuous paths of evolution to the short 
and easy way of immediate actuation. Finally, even leaving aside 
these insurmountable difficulties, it is impossible to answer this 
question: how, once it decided to evolve, to take this roundabout 
way to attain its goal or goals, was this unique substance able to 
will one thing for this and another thing for that, that is, to neu-
tralize each act of will by another, which comes down to having no 
will at all, and which, to repeat, makes its subsequent differentia-
tion incomprehensible?  
By contrast, on the hypothesis of the monads, everything fol-
lows naturally. Each monad draws the world to itself, and thus has 
a better grasp of itself. Of course, they are parts of each other, but 
they can belong to each other to a greater or lesser extent, and each 
aspires to the highest degree of possession; whence their gradu-
al concentration; and besides, they can belong to each other in a 
thousand different ways, and each aspires to learn new ways to ap-
propriate its peers. Hence their transformations. They transform 
in order to conquer; but, since none will ever submit to another 
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except out of self-interest, none can fully accomplish its ambitious 
dream, and the sovereign monad is exploited by its vassal monads, 
even as it makes use of them.
The bizarre and grimacing character of reality, visibly torn 
apart by fratricidal wars, followed by awkward transactions, dem-
onstrates that the world contains multiple agents. Their multiplic-
ity attests to their diversity, and finds its reason only in this diver-
sity. Already born diverse, the agents tend to diversify themselves 
even further, as their nature demands; on the other hand, their 
diversity depends on their being not unities, but totalities of a spe-
cial form.
It seems to me, moreover, that many perplexing enigmas 
could be resolved by imagining that the speciality of each element, 
a true universal medium (milieu), is to be not only a totality, but 
a certain kind of virtuality, and to incarnate within itself a cos-
mic idea which is always called, but rarely destined, to realize it-
self effectively. This would be, as it were, to house Plato’s ideas in 
Epicurus’ atoms, or rather Empedocles’, since, if Zeller is to be be-
lieved, the latter apparently professed, like Leibniz, the diversity of 
elements.59 It is useful, now and again, to be able to take shelter 
behind some Greek ancestor.
Two points are evidently lacking in current transformist theo-
ries of evolution. In conflict with the force which tends to conserve 
living forms, they imagine a diversifying force, which they then 
do not know where to put. In general they disperse it outside the 
organism, in accidents of climate, of environment, of nutrition, 
or of growth, and refuse to recognize an internal cause of diversi-
ty at the heart of the organism itself. Secondly, whether projected 
from inside or stimulated from outside, specific variations, which 
are the building blocks of the Darwinian system, are divergenc-
es without an aim, rebellions without a programme, disordered 
fantasies. However, do we not see, under an established and con-
sistent government, the essential sterility and mutual neutraliza-
tion of oppositions which are not enflamed by any political ideal 
of their own, by any dream of social palingenesis? It is impossible 
to conceive that such madness could triumph in a living being, 
        59. [Trans. Note: Epicurus did hold that atoms were of distinct kinds, but they 
are not as clearly differentiated as the four elements of Empedocles (earth, air, fire 
and water). Leibniz held that each monads or element must be qualitatively dis-
tinct from every other (Monadology §§8-9), and saw this as an argument against 
atomism of the Epicurean type.]
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or that it could be of any possible use; and, were this madness to 
persist for the maximum astronomically possible duration, this 
would not be long enough to make remotely probable the fortu-
itous agreement of these ruptures of equilibrium in a new vital 
equilibrium, the construction of a new order from this accumu-
lated disorder. But, on our hypothesis, the force of diversification 
of forms, as much as the force of their conservation, has a tangible 
support within the organism, and it has a direction. We must see 
every spontaneous modification of a living species, even the most 
fleeting, as aiming towards another species, which it would attain 
if exaggerated sufficiently.
Among the variations, let us not confuse those which are pro-
duced accidentally and from outside, by the vagaries of chance, 
and those which are due to the long-standing struggle, in the heart 
of each organism or of each state, between the triumphant ide-
al that constitutes it, and the constricted and stifled ideals which 
chafe beneath its yoke, yearning to emerge and blossom forth. The 
former are usually neutralized; in most cases it is only the latter 
which come to fruition. All historians, knowingly or not, make 
this distinction. Beside the great facts which they relate often, for 
the sake of their conscience, they emphasize with special care the 
smallest reforms and the most obscure discussions, barely noted 
by their contemporaries, which attest to the appearance of new re-
ligious or political ideas. For example, the slow encroachment of 
royal power upon the feudal order, the skirmishes between parlia-
ments and kings, between commoners and lords. Such and such 
an obscure act of Philip the Fair, which demonstrates a clear ori-
entation towards the still distant administrative centralization of 
modern France, is of more value to the historian than the trial of 
the Templars.60 However bad a social constitution may be, it will 
last until another is conceived. However false the reigning philo-
sophical system, it will persist until the day when a new theory 
comes to dethrone it.
VIII
Since being is having (avoir), it follows that everything must 
be avid (avide). Now, if there is anything so obvious as to strike 
        60. [Trans. Note: The reign of Philip IV the Fair of France (r. 1285-1314) has 
been seen by historians as marking a transition from a charismatic to a more bu-
reaucratic, modern form of monarchical rule. He initiated the suppression of the 
Knights Templar in 1307 and disbanded the Order in 1312.]
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everyone’s eye, it is surely this avidity, the immense ambition 
which from end to end of the world, from the vibrating atom or 
the prolific animalcule to the conquering king, fills and moves ev-
ery being. Every possibility tends towards its realization, every re-
ality tends towards its universalization. Every possibility tends to 
realize itself, to characterize itself precisely: whence the overflow-
ing of variations above and across the living themes, both physical 
and social. Every reality, every characteristic, once formed, tends 
to universalize itself. This is the reason why light and heat radiate 
and why electricity propagates with such evident rapidity, and the 
least atomic vibration aspires by itself to fill the infinite ether, a 
goal to which every other vibration lays a competing claim. This is 
why every species, every living race be it barely formed, multiply-
ing in a geometric progression, would soon cover the entire globe, 
if it did not come up against its equally fertile rivals, and not only 
species and races, but all minimally distinct particularities, and 
even their ailments, a fact which rules out any teleological expla-
nation of fertility falsely considered as a means to the preservation 
of forms. Finally, this is why any social product whatever which 
has its own more or less well-defined character, an industrial prod-
uct, a line of verse, a formula, some political idea which appears 
one day in a corner of someone’s brain, dreams like Alexander of 
the conquest of the world, seeks to project itself in thousands and 
millions of copies everywhere men live, and stops in this path only 
when blocked by the force of its no less ambitious rival. The three 
principal forms of universal repetition, wave-like, generative, imi-
tative, as I have said elsewhere,61 are so many procedures of gov-
ernment and instruments of conquest which give rise to the three 
kinds of physical, vital, and social invasion: vibratory radiation, 
generative expansion, and the contagion of the example.
The child is born a despot: like an African king, as far as he 
is concerned, the other exists only to serve him. Years of punish-
ment and educational constriction are required to cure him of this 
error. We may say that all laws and rules, chemical discipline, vi-
tal discipline, or social discipline, are so many additional brakes 
intended to restrain this omnivorous appetite of every being. In 
general we are rarely conscious of them, we civilized men, sub-
jected to their tyranny from our cradles. Our ambition is aborted, 
crushed even in the egg, and yet how deep must it be to break forth 
        61. [Trans. Note: Tarde develops this tripartite scheme of forms of repetition at 
length in The Laws of Imitation (Les Lois de l’imitation).]
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here and there in history through the least crack in the dykes of 
our habit, defying centuries of hereditary constriction, in bursts 
such as Caesar or Napoleon I!
To come up against one’s limit, to have one’s impotence con-
firmed: what a terrible shock for every man and, above all, what a 
surprise! Surely, in this universal pretention of the infinitely small 
to the infinitely great, and in the universal and eternal shock which 
results, there is some ground for pessimism. For one unique de-
velopment, so many billions of abortions! Our concept of matter 
accurately reflects the essentially frustrating (contrariant) nature 
of the world around us. The psychologists are right, more right 
than they know: external reality exists for us only by its property 
of resisting us, a resistance which is moreover not only haptic, in its 
solidity, but also visual in its opacity, voluntative in its inobedience 
to our wishes, intellectual in its impenetrability to our thought. To 
say that matter is solid is to say that it is inobedient: despite all il-
lusions to the contrary, it is a relation between it and us, and not 
between it and itself, which is described by the former attribute as 
much as by the latter.
Is there any hope of a remedy for this state of affairs? No, to 
judge by the inductions suggested by the example of our societ-
ies: inequality will rather grow more and more between the vic-
tors and the vanquished of the world. The victory of the former 
and the defeat of the latter will grow every day more complete. 
Indeed, one of the most certain indicators of the progress of a 
people’s civilization is that the making of great reputations, great 
military or industrial undertakings, great reforms, and radical 
reorganizations become possible. In other words, the progress 
of civilization, in eliminating dialects and diffusing a single lan-
guage, in effacing differences in customs and establishing a uni-
versal code of law, in nourishing citizens’ minds uniformly by 
means of newspapers, which are more in demand than books, 
and in a thousand other ways, essentially facilitates the ever 
more complete, ever less fragmented realization of a unique indi-
vidual plan by the whole mass of the nation. Hence, thousands of 
different plans which might, at a less advanced stage, have made 
a step towards fulfilment concurrently with the destined victor, 
are doomed to be fatally stifled. John Stuart Mill says very well in 
his Principles of Political Economy: ‘In proportion as [human be-
ings] put off the qualities of the savage, they become amenable 
to discipline; capable of adhering to plans concerted beforehand, 
Monadology and Sociology62
and about which they may not have been consulted; of subordi-
nating their individual caprice to a preconceived determination, 
and performing severally the parts allotted to them in a com-
bined undertaking’.62
At length, after many centuries, we can see to what point na-
tions should be conducted by such progress: to a degree of icy 
splendour and pure regularity which is almost mineral or crystal-
line, and which forms a striking contrast to the bizarre grace and 
the deeply alive complexity of their beginnings.
Leaving such speculations aside, and confining ourselves to 
positive facts, the formation of each thing by propagation start-
ing from a point is not in doubt, and justifies us in admitting the 
existence of leading elements (éléments-chefs). It will be objected 
that it is difficult to discover, among the myriad subjects of one of 
these stellar or molecular, organic or urban States which I imag-
ine, the true master, the founder, centre and focus of these spheres 
and radiations of similar actions, which are repeated and regulat-
ed harmoniously. This is because in reality there exist an infinite 
number of centres and foci, from different points of view and to 
varying degrees. To consider only the most important of these cen-
tres, there still exists, we maintain, at the heart of the sun, the con-
quering atom which by its individual action extended by degrees 
to the whole primordial nebula, disrupted the contented state of 
equilibrium which, we are told, the latter enjoyed. Little by little, 
its attractive influence created a mass, while around it other at-
oms, its crowned vassals, followed its example in separately gath-
ering together several fragments of its vast empire, and shaped 
the planets. And, since this first beginning of time, have these tri-
umphant atoms, imitated by their slaves who exert their own at-
tractive power, ever ceased for an instant their attraction and vi-
bration? In spreading like a contagion through infinite space, has 
their condensatory power diminished? No, for its imitators are not 
only its rivals, but its collaborators.
Likewise, what prodigious conquerors are the infinitesimal 
germs, which succeed in submitting to their dominion a mass 
millions of times greater than their minute size! What a treasury 
of admirable inventions, of ingenious recipes for the exploitation 
and direction of others, emanates from these microscopic cells, 
whose genius and whose smallness should equally amaze us!
        62. [Trans. Note: J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, IV.1, vol. II, 5th ed., 
London, Parker, Son & Bourn 1862, p. 261, §2.]
Gabriel tarde 63
But when I speak of conquest and ambition with respect to 
cellular societies, it is rather of propaganda and devotion that I 
should speak. This is all metaphorical, of course, but nonetheless 
one should choose one’s terminology and points of comparison 
wisely; and moreover I would ask the reader not to forget that, if 
belief and desire, in the pure and abstract sense in which I under-
stand these two great forces, the only two quantities of the soul, 
have the universality which I ascribe to them, it is barely meta-
phorical to use the term idea for the application of belief-force to 
internal qualitative indicators (which, however, bear no relation to 
our sensations and images)—the term intention for the applica-
tion of desire-force to one of these quasi-ideas—the term propagan-
da for the communication from element to element, not of course 
a verbal communication but of unknown specific character, of the 
quasi-intention formed by an originating element,—the term con-
version for the internal transformation of an element into which 
there enters, in place of its own quasi-intention, that of another, 
and so on. Bearing these remarks in mind, let us proceed.
When an empire wishes to extend its power, it sends, to a sin-
gle point on the globe and not a large number of points at once, 
not a single man but an enormous army which, once this point is 
conquered, directs elsewhere its force of devastation. By contrast, 
when the leader of a religion wishes to disseminate it, he sends out 
missionaries as widely as possible, to all points of the compass, to 
create a widely dispersed body of isolated men charged with an-
nouncing the good news and winning souls by persuasion. Now, 
I submit that, in this respect, the processes by which living things 
propagate themselves resemble apostolic propaganda much more 
than military annexation. And, if one adds to this point of similar-
ity a hundred more, if one observes that each living species, like a 
church or a religious community, is a world closed to rival groups, 
and yet hospitable and avid for new recruits,—a world which is 
enigmatic and undecipherable from the outside, where mysterious 
passwords known only to the faithful are exchanged,—a conserva-
tive world in which all must conform scrupulously and indefinite-
ly, with remarkable selflessness, to the traditional rites,—a world 
which is highly hierarchical, yet whose inequalities seem never to 
provoke rebellion—a world at once highly active and highly reg-
ulated, highly persistent and highly flexible, capable of adapting 
readily to changes of circumstance and yet persevering in its age-
old beliefs; then it will be clear that I am not abusing the freedom 
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of analogy by comparing biological phenomena to the religious di-
mensions of our societies rather than to their military, industrial, 
scientific or artistic aspects.
In certain respects, an army resembles an organism just as 
closely as does a convent. The same discipline, the same rigor-
ous subordination, the same power of group solidarity, pertain in 
an organism as in a regiment. The mode of nutrition (that is, re-
cruitment) is also the same, by intussusception, by the periodic in-
corporation of recruits, filling the structure to a quota which is 
never exceeded. However, in other no less important respects, the 
difference is striking: regimentation transforms and regenerates 
the conscript less than nutritive assimilation does the alimentary 
cell, or religious conversion the neophyte. Military education never 
penetrates the conscript’s inmost heart. Hence the lesser persis-
tence and shorter duration of military organizations. Even in bar-
barian societies, their transformations are somewhat abrupt and 
frequent, unless they are in a wholly undeveloped state, in which 
case their incoherence prevents us from comparing them to living 
things, even the simplest. Finally, when an army grows, when a 
regiment reproduces, this reproduction never takes place, as does 
that of living things, by the emission of a unique element around 
which foreign elements subsequently gather. A regiment can re-
produce only by scissiparity; a single soldier or officer, asked hypo-
thetically to form a body of troops in a foreign country by his own 
efforts, would find himself absolutely unable to form a platoon of 
four men with him as corporal.
In virtue of these differential characteristics, life appears to 
us as something respectable and sacred, as a great and generous 
enterprise of salvation and redemption of the elements which are 
chained up in the tight bonds of chemistry; and it is surely to mis-
understand its nature if we consider its evolution, with Darwin, as 
a series of military operations where destruction is the companion 
and condition of victory. This great and prevalent prejudice seems 
to be confirmed by the distressing spectacle of living beings de-
vouring one another; upon seeing a cat’s claw attack a bird’s nest, 
the heart is deeply moved and takes to decrying life’s egotism and 
cruelty. Life, however, is neither egotistical nor cruel and, before 
casting such aspersions on it, we should ask ourselves whether it 
is possible to interpret its most repellent actions in a way which 
can reconcile this horror with the admiration which we cannot 
but feel for the beauty of its works. From the point of view of our 
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hypothesis, nothing could be easier. When a living thing destroys 
another to eat it, the elements of the destroyer intend perhaps to 
offer to the elements of the destroyed the same kind of service 
which the faithful of a religion think they offer the sectaries of 
another cult in breaking their temples, their clerical institutions, 
their religious ties, and endeavouring to convert them to the ‘true 
faith’. What is thus destroyed is beings’ exterior, the elements en-
dowed with faith and love, but faith and love themselves are not 
sacrificed. In general, it must be acknowledged, it is higher forms 
of life which absorb and assimilate the lower, just as the greatest 
and most developed religions, Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, con-
vert the fetishists and not vice versa.
With this concept of life, need I add how one may conceive 
consciousness and death? I call consciousness, soul, mind, the 
transitory victory of an eternal element, which by some favour-
able chance rises above the obscure realm of the infinitesimal, to 
rule a people of brothers who are now become his subjects, sub-
jects them for a little while to his law, handed down by his prede-
cessors and slightly amended by him, or marked by his royal seal; 
and I call death the gradual or sudden dethroning, the voluntary 
or forced abdication of this spiritual conqueror who, like Darius 
after Arbela and Napoleon after Waterloo, Charles V at Yuste and 
Diocletian at Salona,63 but even more completely stripped bare 
once more, returns to the infinitesimal where it was born and 
whence it came, perhaps lamented, certainly not invariable and, 
who knows? not unconscious.
Let us not then say the other life or nothingness, let us say non-
life, without prejudging the question. Non-life is not necessarily 
non-being, any more than is non-ego; and the arguments of cer-
tain philosophers against the possibility of existence after death 
carry no more weight than those of idealist sceptics against the 
reality of the external world.—That life is preferable to non-life; 
again, nothing is less well established. Perhaps life is nothing 
but a time of trials, a drudgery of schoolboy exercises undergone 
by the monads who, on graduating from this hard and mystical 
school, find themselves purged of their former need for universal 
        63. [Trans. Note: The final defeats and abdications of great imperial rulers: 
Darius III of Persia was defeated by Alexander the Great at Arbela (331 BCE) 
and Napoleon by British and Prussian forces at Waterloo (1815); Charles V, Holy 
Roman Emperor, retired to the monastery of Yuste in Extremadura (1556) after 
his abdication, and Diocletian, Roman Emperor, to his palace near Salona in 
Dalmatia (in present-day Split, Croatia; 305 CE.)]
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domination. I am persuaded that few among them, once fallen 
from the cerebral throne, have any wish to return. Restored to 
their original state, to absolute independence, they give up their 
power over the body without suffering and without hoping to re-
turn, and enjoy for all eternity the divine state into which they 
were plunged in the last moment of life, exemption from all evils 
and all desires, though not from all loves, and the certainty of pos-
sessing a concealed and everlasting good.
Thus death would be explained; thus life would be justified, by 
the purgation of desire … But enough hypotheses. Will you, dear 
reader, forgive me this attempt at metaphysics?
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AfterwOrD:  
tArDe’S PANSOCIAL ONtOLOGY
1. INtrODuCtION
Monadology and Sociology (hereafter MS) is a remarkable book 
which has, to date, received relatively little attention, particularly 
in the English-speaking world. It has remained somewhat mar-
ginal to, if not entirely absent from, the remarkable resurgence of 
interest in Tarde’s work over the last decade or so. I believe that 
MS has a substantial and as yet largely unrealized contribution to 
make to contemporary debates, and hope that this translation may 
contribute in some way to the actualization of this possibility.
This afterword, therefore, is not primarily historical. It will 
attempt neither to situate MS in Tarde’s oeuvre or in its histori-
cal time and place, nor to trace the pathways of his re-emergence 
from the shadowy realm of once-lauded thinkers, although much 
useful historical work remains to be done along these lines.1 The 
uncanny combination of the familiar and the strange which 
strikes the contemporary reader of MS will here remain unex-
plained. Rather, the primary goal is to try to establish a niche for 
Tarde’s theory in our current philosophical ecology, and briefly to 
indicate some potential applications. To this end, however, a cer-
tain degree of exegesis and constructive systematization will be 
required, which I hope will not detract too much from the charm 
of the text itself.
The perspective taken will be primarily philosophical 
rather than sociological, and more particularly metaphysical 
        1. A (rather jaundiced) history of Tarde’s reception in 20th-century France can 
be found in L. Mucchielli (2000) ‘Tardomania? Réflexions sur les usages con-
temporains de Tarde’, Revue d’Histoire des Sciences Humaines, vol. 3, pp.161-184.
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orontological,2 in the sense of seeing MS as offering an en-
compassing theory of the make-up of reality. The immediate 
reason for this hermeneutic choice is purely circumstantial,3 
namely that the great majority of work on Tarde, especially that 
published in English, has been primarily focused on his sig-
nificance for debates within the social sciences;4 his place in 
the sociological canon now seems assured, while some work 
is still required to establish a place for his thought in a philo-
sophical context.
The possibility of the choice, however, is perhaps reveal-
ing. As I will argue, the fact that MS, ‘the most metaphysical 
of the works of the most philosophical of sociologists’,5 can be 
read, and offer a wealth of productive insights, from either per-
spective, is deeply rooted in the theory it elaborates. If monadol-
ogy, in Tarde’s hands, is a metaphysics premised on the idea that 
the bonds holding reality together are essentially social, then 
the sociology he invokes is one which has burst its bounds and 
overflowed to the point where its most natural comparators are 
metaphysical. My hope, then, is that Tarde’s thought may help 
to productively corrupt the illusory purity of the philosophical 
standpoint, at the same time as it dismantles the constellations 
of sociological good sense. 
        2. The term ‘ontology’ is not strictly appropriate, since it refers to the study of 
being (Greek ōn, ontos), while Tarde argues that the principle of reality is not be-
ing but having. However, it has the advantage of being broadly familiar in both 
philosophy and, increasingly, social theory to refer to any theoretical characteriza-
tion of the nature of reality. One alternative would be to coin a new term, ‘echon-
tology’ (from ekhōn, -ontos, having), but its (entirely fortuitous) resonances with 
‘echo’ and ‘ecology’ would be distracting, if in some ways rather appropriate. 
        3. For a more considered account of the relation between philosophy and sociol-
ogy, see D. Toews, ‘Tarde and Durkheim and the non-sociological ground of soci-
ology’, in Candea, The Social, cited below.
        4. This said, the secondary literature on Tarde even within the social scienc-
es is still not very extensive. Two major collections are available in English: M. 
Candea (ed.), The Social after Gabriel Tarde: Debates and Assessments, Abingdon, 
Routledge, 2010; and the special issue of Economy and Society edited by A. Barry 
and N. Thrift (Economy and Society, vol. 36, no. 4, 2007). See also D. Toews, ‘The 
new Tarde: Sociology after the end of the social’, Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 
20, no. 5, 2003, pp. 81-98; D. Toews, ‘The renaissance of philosophie Tardienne’, 
Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy, no. 8, 1999, pp. 164-173. The single most 
useful work on MS in English to date is B. Latour, ‘Gabriel Tarde and the end of 
the social’, in P. Joyce, ed., The Social in Question: New Bearings in History and the 
Social Sciences, London, Routledge, 2002, pp. 117-132. 
        5. É. Alliez, ‘Tarde et la problème de la constitution’, in G. Tarde, Monadologie 
et sociologie, Le Plessis, Institut Synthélabo, 1999, p. 9.
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2. PANSOCIAL ONtOLOGY AND the PrIOrItY Of reLAtION
The central and most original insight of MS, from which all the 
rest of the system flows, is that all of nature, organic and inorgan-
ic, at all scales from atoms to stars and galaxies, consists of societ-
ies. This thesis implies the slightly less original but no less chal-
lenging theory that every entity has some form of mind, self, or 
subjectivity (the theory of panpsychism or ‘psychomorphism’).6 
Tarde uses the term ‘universal sociology’ to describe this in-
sight; however, it is necessary to distinguish the basic idea that 
all things are societies from the theoretical toolbox required to 
investigate these non-human societies, which will be furnished 
by a generalization of sociological theory in the usual sense, and 
more particularly of the theory set out in Tarde’s sociological 
works. I will use the term ‘pansocial ontology’7 for the former, 
which will be the primary focus here, reserving universal so-
ciology in the narrow sense for the latter. In principle, the two 
are independent: one might imagine a whole range of compet-
ing universal sociologies on the basis of the same basic insight, 
and indeed, it can be argued that on certain points Tarde’s own 
sociological views are in tension with the metaphysical impera-
tives of the system. That said, there is a continuous exchange of 
ideas between the two domains, making the distinction to some 
extent artificial, but it is of value in isolating the philosophically 
most distinctive contributions of Tarde’s thought.
MS puts forward two arguments for pansociality (and panpsy-
chism), one analogical and one conceptual. The argument from 
analogy is that reality is structured like a society, and the entities 
which make it up behave like living things. As Tarde notes, this 
analogy was familiar enough at the time of writing, in the form 
of the theory of society as analogous to a living organism, which 
was most exhaustively set out in Spencer’s ‘The Social Organism’ 
but also had a broad appeal for many social theorists, and which 
can arguably be traced back to Aristotle’s Politics. However, Tarde 
        6. Neither MS nor this afterword are terminologically exact on the vocabulary 
of minds and selves; MS uses ‘mind’, ‘spirit’ and ‘psyche’ and their derivatives 
more or less interchangeably. However, the decision not to adopt Tarde’s own 
term ‘psychomorphism’ and its companion ‘sociomorphism’ is deliberate, since 
their tentativeness is belied by the theory itself.
        7. The term ‘pansocial’ is coined (avoiding the misleading connotations of ‘pan-
socialist’) on the model of ‘panpsychist’ and ‘pantheist’. Not only the model: as 
noted, Tarde’s theory is also a panpsychism, and in his own terms a ‘myriathe-
ism’ (p. 25), which might be less elegantly paraphrased as polypantheism. 
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is not directly concerned to build on such theories.8 Their main 
failing is to deploy the analogy in a limited and inverted form rela-
tive to MS: limited, in that the analogy is restricted to living things 
and not extended to inorganic nature, and inverted, in that it com-
pares society to an organism rather than vice versa, in the service 
of an organicist theory of society rather than a pansocial theory 
of the organism. Thus, while Tarde avails himself of the work of 
these theories where they are useful, his own use of the analogy 
has a rather different goal. In particular, as I will argue, the point 
for Tarde is not to hypostasize the social or exalt its importance 
as against that of the individual, but to utilize the relationship be-
tween individual and society as a model for metaphysical theory 
more broadly.
The implications of the analogical argument for pansociality 
are pursued in detail throughout MS, and need be only briefly re-
hearsed here. Any physical structure perpetuates itself by simi-
lar means to a social order: through educational and institution-
al discipline, the manipulation of incentives, the promulgation 
of ideologies and the threat of violence. One might say that for 
Tarde, all of reality, to the extent that it endures, has the charac-
ter of the Sartrean practico-inert, the cooled sediments of once 
fluid social interactions. This implies that the apparent stability 
of macroscopic material phenomena is, first, only provisional—
albeit on timescales vastly greater than that of a human society 
or culture—and, second, the outcome of a co-ordination among a 
huge number of elements whose being is not exhausted by their 
belonging to a particular aggregate, and which collaborate more 
or less willingly. As Latour puts it, Tarde refuses the distinction 
between the law and what is subject to the law.9 That is, rather 
than physical laws explaining the co-ordination and predictability 
of natural movements, the former are rather explained by the lat-
ter—or more precisely, they are nothing more than the social or-
ganization of the elements such that their intentions and beliefs 
are directed, by coercion or persuasion, towards a common goal. 
These ostensibly law-governed forms of organization are akin 
to political régimes, which may last for a considerable length of 
time, but will sooner or later fall victim to some form of evolution-
ary or revolutionary transformation. 
        8. Elsewhere he criticizes them strongly, although for rather different reasons 
than those which concern us here (see Social Laws (Les Lois sociales), ch. I).
        9. B. Latour, ‘Gabriel Tarde and the end of the social’.
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The panpsychist side of the analogy is set out in terms of the 
theory of belief and desire as ‘psychological quantities’. Without 
going into the detail of the theory,10 it enables Tarde to elaborate 
the mind- or self-like qualities of non-human things without as-
cribing to them, for example, a capacity for conscious thought or 
cognition. At the most basic level, desire is manifest in inorganic 
nature in the form of force, and belief as the constancy of material 
substance. Material bodies enter into conflicts, exchanges or dia-
logues with one another, changing their positions and movements 
as a result. The more complex systems of forces which act to co-
ordinate and organize matter into physical or organic structures 
resemble institutions or ideologies which have the power to inti-
mately shape the selfhood of their members or adherents.
As noted, however, the argument from analogy is not intend-
ed to stand alone, although it forms the basis of many of the most 
interesting theoretical elaborations of MS (and is not always ex-
pounded with absolute seriousness). There is also a conceptu-
al or perhaps epistemological argument.11 Tarde argues that we 
know ourselves immediately and from within not only as think-
ing subjects, or pointlike centres of cognition. Rather, our in-
trospective self-knowledge is already complex and structured, in 
two ways. First, we are both mind and body, embodied minds or 
animate bodies. Second, we are members of a society, partici-
pants in a culture, and speakers of a language. He concludes by 
arguing that this immediate knowledge of ourselves is the only 
reliable knowledge of being we have, and in fact that the only 
way we can understand what beings are is on the analogy of our 
        10. Further detail can be found in Tarde’s essay ‘Belief and Desire (‘La Croyance 
et le désir’, in Essais et mélanges sociologiques). On my reading, the value of this 
theory of ‘psychological quantities’ is heuristic rather than foundational; I would 
also argue that, considered as an ontological postulate rather than a methodolog-
ical guideline, it is one of the weaker points of the argument. However, other 
readings place much greater emphasis on this aspect, including those as differ-
ent from each other as Lazzarato’s and Latour’s (M. Lazzarato, ‘Gabriel Tarde: un 
vitalisme politique’, in G. Tarde, Monadologie et Sociologie, ed. cited; B. Latour, 
‘Tarde’s idea of quantification’, in Candea, The Social, cited above).
        11. In a fuller exposition, this argument might be reconstructed in a number 
of forms, for example, as a transcendental argument or one from conceptual par-
simony. Hartshorne, following Whitehead (and independently of Tarde), nicely 
summarizes the general idea: ‘If feeling is the most general category of the im-
mediately given, then we can form no more general category by which to de-
scribe existence in general than this very character’ (C. Hartshorne, Whitehead’s 
Philosophy, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1972, p.28).
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own being, which is defined primarily by the relations of body to 
mind and of individual to society.
The implications of this argument can be seen at both logical 
and ontological levels. The logical implication is that relation is 
prior to being (this, again, is why ‘ontology’ is not a strictly accu-
rate term for the Tardean theory). The idea of an entity which ex-
ists in itself is logically posterior to the complex structures of the 
ensouled body and the social person, although simpler to describe. 
In particular, the ideas of mind or material object, or person or so-
ciety, do not pre-exist this relation but rather are constituted by 
and within it. The ontological implication is that the basic nature 
of reality is animate and socially connected. For certain purposes 
one may wish to abstract from this fundamental truth—for exam-
ple, in positing purely material things with no psychic aspect—
but this will be at the cost of ignoring their basic, relational, reality. 
As against a large part of the mainstream philosophical 
tradition,12 then, we do not first encounter ourselves, then a ma-
terial reality outside ourselves, and then other persons or selves 
as the exterior of that exterior, but rather encounter first ourselves 
as social and embodied beings, and then material reality as an ab-
straction from this social embodiment. It is at this point that the 
conceptual argument for pansociality rejoins the argument from 
analogy. Tarde sees the supposed characteristics of the physical 
world—the forces of gravity or magnetism, or the solidity of mat-
ter itself—as humans’ introspective self-perceptions, externalized 
and congealed to the point where their true origin is obscured. As 
much as an animistic re-enchantment of the cosmos, this might 
be seen as an extension of the Xenophanean or Feuerbachian cri-
tique of religion to the domain of physics. Where generations of 
social scientists have followed Vico in holding that society is more 
intimately and hence more adequately known than the natural 
world, if less precisely, Tarde radicalizes this argument to the point 
where only society is known, and the natural world can be known 
only insofar as it is itself composed of societies.
Tarde elucidates the specificity of his position here (pp. 16ff.) 
by comparison with the panpsychist but non-pansocial monis-
tic ontologies popular in his own time, which generally rest on 
some form of dual-aspect strategy: that is, they hold that there is 
a single (type of) substance, which has thought and materiality or 
        12. Roughly, the part which goes from Descartes to Husserl; see the latter’s 
sixth Cartesian Meditation.
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extension as attributes, aspects, or descriptions, and thus that all 
material things are capable of thought.13 The problem with such 
theories is that the concept of thought has no ontologically signifi-
cant meaning in its own right, but derives its content purely from 
an introspective sense of selfhood: hence it tends to become a 
pure interiority without empirical content, merely doubling what 
is already known with an illusion of depth. Indeed, for some of its 
19th-century proponents this lack of content seems to have been 
a major point in its favour, in that it facilitates the reconciliation 
of Christian or quasi-Christian doctrines of an immaterial and 
immortal soul with an avowedly materialistic account of the na-
ture of reality. 
By contrast, the social-individual and mind-body relations 
are both known immediately and introspectively and have com-
plex ontological structures of their own. Hence, our introspec-
tive knowledge of our own being is not separate from our un-
derstanding of the rest of reality, but of itself provides the logical 
blocks from which the latter is built. As MS sets out to explain, 
the nature and coherence of the universe as a whole can be con-
structed from this basic relation. These two monolithic dual-
isms, mind against matter and structure against agency, whose 
irresolution is the original sin of ontology and social theory re-
spectively, are not resolved by the pansocial theory so much as 
generalized, and the tension they generate harnessed to the mo-
tor of cosmic evolution.
3. tArDe AND LeIbNIz
Pansocial ontology builds upon the work of previous thinkers 
within the philosophical tradition. Space precludes an extensive 
attempt to situate Tarde with respect to that tradition (or to con-
struct a monadological counter-tradition), and I will restrict myself 
here to his most obvious predecessor, Leibniz. While MS does not 
set out the connection at any great length, there is obviously a sub-
stantial debt, and the several continuities between the two systems 
are of assistance in interpreting the theory of MS. There are three 
primary points of contact: the essentially composite nature of real-
ity; the idea that substances must be souls, with the concomitant 
        13. Such panpsychist monisms are by no means moribund, as demonstrated 
by the work of Galen Strawson. These ontologies are sometimes described as 
Spinozist; this seems wrong to me, for the reasons set out in the remainder of 
the paragraph.
Afterword: Tarde’s Pansocial Ontology78
sharp distinction between real substances and aggregates; and the 
idea that every substance is affected by every other. 
There are clearly also some points of divergence: Leibniz’ ten-
dency to reduce external relations to internal ones—famously 
expressed as ‘the monads have no windows’ (Monadology §7)—
seems uncongenial to Tarde, given that, as we have seen, he sees 
relation as the fundamental reality. (This said, Leibniz did take 
himself to be elucidating the ordinary concept of relation, rath-
er than explaining it away.) Leibniz’ strong emphasis on the in-
variability of the laws of nature, and his conviction that the age of 
miracles is over, is also a point of disagreement. Finally, we might 
observe that Leibniz is strongly committed to the principle of suf-
ficient reason, and to the idea that the concept of each substance 
embodies its whole history, while Tarde’s theory emphasizes the 
role of unpredictable collisions in explaining the nature of reality; 
however, as we will see, they may not be as far apart on this point 
as they initially seem. 
The first point which Tarde takes from Leibniz, then, is that 
the principles of reality are plural in nature: the most basic feature 
of the universe is its consisting of a multiplicity of distinct sub-
stances or elements. In other words, reality is not a continuum di-
vided into parts, but a bringing together of entities which can in 
principle be understood independently of the situations they thus 
constitute (subject, for Leibniz, to their common dependence on 
God). The treatment of space and time in monadological theories 
is an example. Leibniz, in his debate with the Newtonian Samuel 
Clarke, argues that space and time are not absolute nor prior to 
the substances which occupy them, but relative to the relations 
among substances. That is, it is the relations between the monads 
which are basic; we then apprehend these as taking spatiotempo-
ral form, and finally abstract the concepts of space and time in 
general. Along similar lines, Tarde argues against Kant that space 
and time are not pure forms of intuition, or a kind of matrix of ex-
perience, but are rather experienced directly as ‘primitive concepts 
or continuous and original quasi-sensations’ (p. 17).14 A corollary 
of the insight that reality is composite is that the individuals which 
compose it must be really, and not only numerically, different: they 
        14. Tarde’s formulation of this theory links space and time to belief and desire, 
respectively, such that physical or geometric space is one type of logical or thetic 
space (as for Leibniz), while the direction of time derives from the goal-oriented-
ness of desire (see Universal Opposition (L’Opposition universelle), ch. VI, sec 4).
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are not only plural and distinct, but heterogeneous, such that each 
is in principle distinguishable from all others.
The second point in common is that substances are souls, 
which was examined in its Tardean form in the previous section. 
The desire to ‘spiritualize the universe’ (p. 16) which both sys-
tems manifest is perhaps the most obvious point of commonality 
in terms of traditional ontology, but there is more tension in this 
aspect of the relationship than might appear at first sight. For one 
thing, Tarde is not committed, as Leibniz is, to denying the real-
ity of the material as such. More deeply, Leibniz’ argument for 
this conclusion places a heavy weight on the idea of unity and its 
co-priority with being. That is, substance, or real entity, must be 
a unity: ‘what is not truly one entity is not truly one entity either’ 
(letter to Arnauld, 30 April 1687). A material thing cannot be said 
to be truly one, since it is divisible; only an entity with a substan-
tial form or entelechy akin to a human soul or self can be said to 
be a substance. The Leibnizian ontology is therefore akin to the 
Tardean in resting on a sharp distinction between substances and 
mere aggregates, and in its insistence on tracing back the reality 
of the composite to the elements of which it is composed;15 and for 
both thinkers, this is closely linked to the panpsychist ascription 
of mind-like qualities to all elementary substances. However, the 
path which Leibniz traces—the plurality and distinctness of the el-
ementary substances implies their independent reality, which im-
plies their unity and coherence, which implies their kinship with 
mind—is oblique to the Tardean argument, which rather rests on 
the basic relational complexity of the embodied mind.
Regardless of this divergence, many of the corollaries which 
Leibniz draws from this argument are also taken up by Tarde. 
Three points are particularly relevant. First, the mind- or self-like 
qualities of the elementary substances admit of degree. Unlike 
        15. Tarde relates this point to Leibniz’ invention of the differential calculus. The 
question of the relation between Leibniz’ metaphysics and the calculus is an issue 
we cannot here address, although it clearly has implications for the Tardean sys-
tem. Part of the difficulty in establishing these implications is that, while Leibniz 
appears to have been committed to the reality of infinitesimals, the only viable 
interpretation of the calculus in Tarde’s time was the theory of limits, which pre-
serves the mathematical utility of the method while not requiring the analyst to 
work with real infinitesimal quantities (and which still stands as the foundation 
of standard analysis, but now co-exists with the non-standard analysis introduced 
by Abraham Robinson in the 1960s, which treats infinitesimal quantities as per-
fectly valid entities). 
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the Cartesian world, in which subjects endowed with mind are 
sharply separated from material reality (including non-human an-
imals), the Leibnizian is composed of monads of various levels of 
perfection, from human souls through animal souls to the lesser 
monads of the inorganic world. Second, a complex being such as 
a living organism should be thought of as a complex arrangement 
of monads within which there is a single directing monad (the or-
ganism’s soul) and a large number of subordinate monads which 
correspond to the various bodily parts, a hierarchical arrange-
ment which is also of value in explicating Tardean monadology. 
Third, these mind-like qualities are not exhausted by conscious 
states: below the threshold of consciousness, there exist percepts 
(for Leibniz) or beliefs and desires (for Tarde) which are different 
only in degree from those which actually form part of experience. 
The final point is that, for Leibniz, every monad is related 
to every other and contains a representation of any other, such 
that they mutually reflect each other to the greatest possible ex-
tent, and each one contains the whole universe in nuce. However, 
in line with the preceding point, some relations are much closer, 
and some representations much clearer and more adequate, than 
others. To borrow a formula from an earlier monadologist: ‘ev-
erything is in everything, but appropriately’ (Proclus, Elements of 
Theology §53). Tarde makes his commitment to this general princi-
ple clear in MS ch. III, and as I will argue, it plays a key role in the 
structure of his system, albeit in a very different form.
4. eLeMeNt AND AGGreGAte
The comparison with Leibniz helps to focus attention on the 
strong emphasis of Tarde’s theory on the elements of reality. What 
are these elements? At first sight, Tarde (like Leibniz) may seem 
to offer contradictory answers. For example, he sees individual hu-
man beings as both exemplary monadic elements—this is indeed 
one of the bases of the theory, as already noted—and as composed 
of numerous elements. The key to resolving these difficulties is 
to recall the priority of relation. It is not the element itself which 
is the basis in Tarde’s theory but its relation to the social aggre-
gates of which it forms a part. Thus, the emphasis on identifying 
the elementary components of reality does not require singling 
out a class of entities which are elements in an absolute sense, al-
though this will generally be possible and useful once the domain 
of the relation is held fixed, and there need be no contradiction in 
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a single (type of) entity standing in this relation in both directions, 
being an element while also being composed of elements. 
Thus, when Tarde says that the principles of reality are to be 
found in the domain of the ‘infinitesimal’, he means this term to 
be taken literally, in that the elements are smaller than any assign-
able quantity or entity which can be identified, but also as relative to 
a particular perspective.16 In this sense, the elements are whatever 
exists on the scale smaller than the one which is the current focus 
of one’s attention. ‘[T]hese ultimate elements which form the final 
stage of every science … are ultimate only from the point of view of 
their particular science’ (p. 8). So, for example, if one’s interest is 
in human societies or animal species, the element will be the indi-
vidual human or animal; if in an organism, the cell; if in material 
entities, the atom; if in spatiotemporal reality in general, it will be 
the infinitesimal in the usual sense of the term. The fact that the 
notion of element does not pick out a privileged stratum of reality 
independently of a specific perspective is reflected in Tarde’s con-
viction that scientific explanation cannot, in principle, ever find an 
ultimate reality at which it can rest. The discovery of ever-smaller 
organisms, he hints, may not come to an end with single-celled 
animalcules. Similarly, the discovery or theorization of ever more 
basic building-blocks of matter will not end with the atom, which 
will itself, sooner or later, be found to have a composite structure.17
Tarde’s ontology of the elementary can thus be seen as a mid-
dle way between holistic doctrines of emergent properties, which 
grant the aggregate properties not present in the elements, and re-
ductionisms which identify a class of entities as basic and attempt 
        16. We could go one step further here and see the elements as purely differen-
tial or functional (this reading is suggested by Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 
trans. P. Patton, London, Athlone, 1994, pp. 313-314, and developed in more detail 
by D. Debaise, ‘Une métaphysique des possessions: Puissances et sociétés chez 
Gabriel Tarde’, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, vol. 60, no. 4, 2008, pp. 447-
460, and I. Joseph, ‘Gabriel Tarde: Le monde comme féerie’, Critique, vol. 40, nos. 
445/446, 1984, pp. 548-565). However, this reading seems to me to abstract too 
rapidly away from the role they play in specific contexts, and hence to lose much 
of what is distinctive in the ontology of MS, particularly regarding the monads’ 
tendency to universalization (see below).
        17. Of course, while the biological point has fared less well, the physical point is 
convincingly borne out by subsequent history. Even today, it is not implausible that 
the most basic particles currently known, quarks and leptons, may have some com-
posite substructure (models positing such structure have been widely canvassed 
and explored empirically at the Large Hadron Collider and other sites, although at 
currently attained energy levels, little confirmation has been forthcoming).
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to construct others from them.18 He argues strongly and explic-
itly (against holism) that the element is ontologically prior to the 
aggregate, but as argued above, pansocial ontology also implies 
(against reductionism) that the relation between them is prior to 
either of its terms, as the relation between the individual and soci-
ety is prior to either as an entity. This priority of the relation over 
the relata is reflected in the vertiginous opening-up of ever small-
er scales beneath whatever stopping point we might have hoped to 
form the basis of our explanations. 
The absence of a real final term to the series also, to some 
extent, undermines the attempt to domesticate it by thinking in 
terms of nested levels of reality, of the form atom-molecule-pro-
toplasm-cell-organism-society (although MS does sometimes talk 
in such terms, particularly ch. VI) and the concomitant tendency 
to see pansociality itself through the prism of the hierarchy, such 
that lower levels are societies in progressively more simplified and 
attenuated ways.19 Rather than filtering downwards in stages from 
the paradigmatic case of human persons and societies, the pan-
psychist and pansocial analogies radiate outwards, and illuminate 
each case anew. The ontological structure induced by the analogy 
might be compared to the traces of the more perfect radial symme-
try of supposedly lower forms which Nature retains beneath the 
bilateral symmetry evolved for locomotion (ch. IV).20
Thus, despite the priority of element to aggregate, there is a 
balance of power between the two in each domain of the Tardean 
universe. To discern this balance within the various scientific the-
ories covering these domains will require some shifts of empha-
sis. In some cases, Tarde will need to argue against a too strong 
subordination of elements to structure, as with the biological 
thought of his time, where the prevailing emphasis on the unity 
and self-organizing capacity of the organism must be countered 
        18. As already noted, Durkheimian sociology is the paradigm of holism; ex-
amples of reductionism in the sociological context might be individualisms of 
the rational-choice type, and in philosophical ontology the various flavours of 
physicalism. 
        19. There is reason to think that these hierarchical ontologies are the perennial 
temptation of monadological thought. They were also more a feature of Tarde’s 
philosophical surroundings than may appear at first glance; although generally 
unpalatable to 19th-century tastes in their raw Renaissance-Neoplatonist form, 
they retained considerable appeal when sublimated into a historical narrative, as 
in Cournot’s Treatise or, come to that, Hegel.
        20. This might be described as ‘the lost symmetry of the blastosphere’ (J. G. 
Ballard, The Atrocity Exhibition, St Albans, Triad Panther, 1979, p. 14). 
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with an assertion of the independent viability, in principle, of the 
elements which constitute it. Edmond Perrier’s theories of evolu-
tion by aggregation into colonies provide a useful support at this 
point. Sociology is another example, and an analogous argument 
forms the core of Tarde’s critique of Durkheim. In other cases—
and particularly in the case of inorganic nature—the monadolo-
gist will be arguing for the presence and relevance of structures 
which are logically irreducible to the action of mechanical forces 
on otherwise inert bodies, and which can only be explained by ap-
pealing to the capacity of these bodies to enter into relations of as-
sociation, emulation or competition.21
Another, more dynamic, way of seeing this relationship is in 
terms of difference and identity, or heterogeneity and homogene-
ity. Tarde argues along Leibnizian lines that numerically distinct 
monads must also be qualitatively different. Thus, Tarde argues, 
it must be possible in principle to distinguish any two distinct at-
oms of the same element (using ‘element’ here in the conventional 
sense), even if this cannot be achieved in practice due to the gross-
ness of our instruments. Due to our epistemic and sensory limita-
tions, our experience of the world of aggregates contains sizeable 
tracts of homogeneity, but the belief that this homogeneity can be 
read back into the elements arises from an anthropocentric preju-
dice which will dissolve in the light of a more adequate knowledge, 
as the indistinct murmur of the forest resolves into the combina-
tion of the voices of the individual leaves (p. 45).22 The heterogene-
ity of the elements underwrites their priority over the aggregate, 
in the sense that if they were perfectly homogenous, their shared 
form as expressed in the aggregate would exhaust their being and 
hence have a good claim, on the grounds of conceptual economy if 
nothing else, to be considered more basic than the elements. 
        21. That is, on my reading, the apparent ‘reductionism’ or ‘individualism’ of 
Tarde’s theory is tactical rather than fundamental (although it may appear fun-
damental in sociological contexts—in the conventional sense of the term—and 
particularly in the debate with Durkheim). This seems to me a clear differend be-
tween sociologically inclined readings such as Latour’s (‘Gabriel Tarde and the 
end of the social’, cited above) and more philosophical readings such as mine and 
Alliez’, which complicate the picture of Tarde as an individualist (É. Alliez, ‘Tarde 
et le problème’, cited above; É. Alliez, ‘The difference and repetition of Gabriel 
Tarde’, Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory, vol. 5, no. 2, 2004, pp. 
49-54). However, Toews sees it as a choice between (meta-)philosophical stand-
points (Toews, ‘The renaissance’, cited above).
        22. A very similar metaphor of the sound of the sea and the waves is a favourite 
of Leibniz’ (e.g. Discourse on Metaphysics §33; letter to Arnauld, 9 October 1687).
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This heterogeneity is not a mere logical structure, however, 
but manifests itself determinately in the form of an alternation 
with homogeneity. That is, Tarde does not simply identify the ele-
ment with the heterogeneous and the aggregate with the homog-
enous. On the contrary, the aggregation of elements does not reli-
ably generate homogeneity, and to the extent that it does, this often 
largely serves to increase heterogeneity again. Thus, heterogene-
ity and homogeneity, or difference and identity, mutually produce 
each other in a continually renewed reflection of the fundamen-
tal element-aggregate polarity. This mutual implication is not the 
last word, however. Tarde argues that in any given context, differ-
ence will be found to be the first and last term of the series, and in 
this sense is more fundamental than identity; outside of any such 
context, no first or last term is to be found, and thus—since iden-
tity can more readily be constructed from the aggregation of dif-
ference than difference can as the fragmentation of identity, since 
this fragmentation would be inexplicable except on the basis of 
the prior difference—the very endlessness of the alternation tends 
to affirm the priority of difference. (To put this argument another 
way: because elements can enter into relation, they are distinct; 
because they are distinct, as Leibniz argues, they are different; be-
cause they are different they cannot be perfectly simple, and must 
therefore have substructure and elements of their own, which will 
in turn exhibit their own differences.)
Tarde offers two analogies from human societies for the mu-
tually productive relation between difference and identity. One is 
the progressive standardization of language and culture across 
a national territory, at the expense of local dialects and ways of 
life, which serves, by increasing the possibilities for interaction 
between individuals, to greatly expand their sphere of action and 
accentuate their individuality. The other is the growth of large au-
thoritarian institutions such as armies, where the homogeniza-
tion of individuals through coercive power serves to greatly ampli-
fy the decisions made by the few individuals who are empowered 
by the system to give orders. The two images appear contradic-
tory in their implications; when pushed, it seems that Tarde is 
more committed to the first. His prediction of the terminus of 
this movement of homogenization in the ‘crystalline’ perfection 
of a purely transparent society (p. 62)23 is intended to evoke not a 
        23. Tarde here (p. 29) builds on Cournot’s insight that social progress tends 
to make society ever more predictable and law-governed, like the world of 
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dystopia of totalitarian surveillance, but on the contrary a vision 
of emancipation in which the claims of society on the individual 
dwindle to nothingness, and free association replaces the obliga-
tions of social life. Nonetheless, both make the same underlying 
theoretical point, which is that identity is ultimately for the sake 
of difference. 
Tarde thus seems to (and has been taken to) provide support 
for the kinds of declarations of which have become standard across 
much of philosophy and social science over the last half-century, 
in favour of the particular rather than the general, the local rather 
than the universal, diversity rather than unity, and so on. However, 
it is instructive to note what separates MS from these ritualistic in-
vocations, and hence demonstrates its real value in understanding 
their philosophical consequences. First, the very speculative élan 
of Tarde’s text, and his willingness to make strong empirical pre-
dictions regarding, for example, the nature of molecular bonding, 
constitute a powerful challenge to those affirmations of diversity 
which remain limited to the conceptual and social domains, and 
are happy to accept the homogeneity of the domains of biology or 
physics and the invariability of their laws (and thus hypostasize 
a division which can never be made watertight, since human be-
ings are also organic and material entities). Second, Tarde avoids a 
simple inverted reductionism, in which identity would be a mere 
veil over a reality of diversity. Reality is rather the productive al-
ternation and mutual implication of the two, an alternation with-
in which difference is determinative only in virtue of being more 
persistent. The priority of heterogeneity, then, licenses neither an 
uncritical celebration of a supposed liberation of difference from 
the coercion of identity—which would be only to reinscribe this 
identity as the unquestionability of a moral precept—nor, in gen-
eral, any final reconciliation of the two, beyond their mutual con-
flict and constitution. 
5. PrOPertY AND AVIDItY
Tarde’s system, then, poses as powerful a challenge to reduction-
ism as to holism. Indeed, it enables us to see the two as mutu-
ally reinforcing, in that they rely on the same dynamic of unveil-
ing, the discernment of substance beneath phenomenon or cause 
Newtonian physics, such that the transparency of the interactions of simple bod-
ies at the base of the ontological hierarchy resonates with the transparency of so-
cial interactions at its summit.
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behind effect, only pursued in opposite directions. Tarde’s theory 
steps outside of their apparent opposition, enabling us to see both 
as forms of substantialism, that is, as demands to choose a cer-
tain subset of entities as principles of all the rest.24 I have argued 
that this challenge is premised on the priority of relation with re-
spect to entity. Nonetheless, if it is the dynamic of unveiling itself, 
rather than any specific set of ontological commitments, which 
is the core of substantialist metaphysics, then effectively counter-
ing the latter will require more than simply asserting the prior-
ity of relation, since otherwise there is a risk of reproducing the 
substantialist narrative while simply replacing entity with relation 
(or force or process or whatever) at its final resolution, and claim-
ing to overcome substantialism by means of a ‘dynamism’ which, 
Tarde suggests (p. 20), is rarely satisfying even on its own terms. 
What is required is a positive account of relation which is suffi-
ciently constructive to provide a coherent alternative metaphysics, 
while resisting the recuperation of relation into a special kind of 
substance. Tarde’s theory of properties provides such an account.
Three stages can be distinguished in Tarde’s argument. First, 
he observes that social relations in the general sense of the term 
can be thought of in terms of ‘possession’ or ‘having’, of the re-
lationship of proprietor to property. Such relations can be either 
unilateral, such as that of master to slave, or reciprocal, such as 
that between the parties in a commercial transaction. Second, 
this notion of possession can be generalized to non-human so-
cieties, such that, for example, a material particle can be said to 
‘possess’ all the other particles on which it exerts a force. The the-
ory of possession thus generalizes the theory of belief and desire 
as psychological quantities; it can be seen as giving ontological 
content to the logical idea of relation, while retaining the general-
ity of the latter. The other forms of relation required for scientific 
or metaphysical explanation can then be reconstructed on this ba-
sis: agency or causality, for example, are merely forms of posses-
sion, and are less suited to form ultimate principles because their 
scope is narrower.
        24. This critique is what enables us to see Tarde’s theory as an ontology of ‘uni-
vocity’, in Deleuze’s terms (Difference and Repetition, cited above; for this con-
nection see Debaise, ‘Une métaphysique des possessions’, cited above), or as a 
‘flat ontology’ in DeLanda’s (M. DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, 
London, Continuum, 2002). On my reading, however, there are considerable dif-
ferences between these thinkers’ development of this idea and Tarde’s; space pre-
cludes a detailed engagement with this point. 
theo Lorenc 87
Finally, the relation of substance to attribute (or ‘property’ in 
the philosophical sense) can also be reconstructed as a form of 
possession. The idea here would seem to be that attributes are al-
ways more or less disguised modes of relation between elements. 
However, these relations are themselves simply ways of describ-
ing or identifying other elements. A primary quality such as the 
mass of a body can be seen in terms of the gravitational force it ex-
erts, which is really a way of describing the other bodies within its 
sphere of influence. A secondary quality such as a body’s colour 
will be seen in terms of a relation to human or animal visual sys-
tems, which is the possession of the body by the latter rather than 
vice versa, and hence reduces to the operation of such visual sys-
tems. That is, as Tarde clearly says, the properties of an element 
are other elements, not relations with other elements. 
Thus, the central image which expresses proprietorship is that 
of centre and sphere, not of node and link, and the overarching vi-
sion is not of an interconnected network but of a dense froth of in-
terpenetrating spheres, in which both the circumference and the 
centre are everywhere. To return to the point with which I began 
this section, the displacement of entities by relations as the basis 
of reality, if it is not to slip into the reification of relations into a 
special kind of entity, must be doubled by a further shift from the 
relation to the field on which it acts. That is, while the priority of 
having over being certainly entails the priority of the relation of 
having over the entities which possess and are possessed, the still 
more fundamental reality is that of what Tarde calls ‘avidity’, or the 
abstract urge to possess. From the point of view of the element, it 
itself is the centre which emanates the sphere by projecting radii, 
but ontologically it is the sphere which is given, and both the cen-
tre and the radii constructed from it.
This avidity is manifest in the elements’ desire to enter into 
relation with their peers, to gain hegemony and influence over 
them and to expand their spheres of action, a desire which can 
never be satiated, but always strives to transcend any given situa-
tion or structure. By the same token this desire is never fulfilled 
or completely expressed; sooner or later it will always be met by 
other monads’ competing desires. Indeed, Tarde argues, attempts 
to predominate by brute force are unlikely to succeed; rather, any 
element can only attain even the most limited success by tactical-
ly co-opting others’ drive to hegemony. Reality as we perceive it is 
built up out of these transactions and conflicts between avidities. 
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This is reflected the omnipresence of conflict, competition and 
exchange;25 nonetheless, the macroscopic world in which we usu-
ally live consists largely of stable and enduring entities in reason-
ably co-operative relationships, which reflect the success of certain 
elements in gaining control over others or inspiring their emula-
tion, and stamping their impressions on the resulting aggregates.
This avidity, however, is not a blind drive to gain power, or to 
reproduce, although the sexual instinct is surely one of the clear-
est examples of it, but contains in miniature a plan for the reorga-
nization of the cosmos as a whole. Against the Darwinian account 
of evolution—which might otherwise appear rather congruent 
with the picture of reality sketched in the preceding paragraph—
Tarde holds that every minor change, even the most fleeting and 
least successful mutation, has implicit within it a complete vision 
of the cosmos; the tiniest motion can only be understood by ex-
tending it to infinity, and the narrowest idea by drawing its most 
far-reaching conclusions. The drive of each monad to extend its 
sphere of influence is the drive to actualization of a virtual idea 
of the universe. ‘[T]he speciality of each element, a true univer-
sal medium, is to be not only a totality, but a certain kind of virtu-
ality, and to incarnate within itself a cosmic idea which is always 
called, but rarely destined, to realize itself effectively. This would 
be, as it were, to house Plato’s ideas in Epicurus’ atoms, or rather 
Empedocles’ (p. 58). Perhaps the most striking aspect of this idea 
is the priority it grants to the virtual over the actual. However, it is 
important also to note what underwrites this priority, namely each 
monad’s having an image of the universe and a plan for its trans-
formation, in view of which it continually acts. Thus, Tarde refus-
es to abandon the idea of universal explanatory principles along 
the lines of the Platonic Forms, but seeks to rejuvenate them by 
scattering throughout the universe an infinite number of copies,26 
writing in the heart of each atom an alternative virtual history of 
the whole, all of which are more coherent than the history which 
actually transpires.
By the standards of the philosophical tradition, the theory 
which results is curiously hybrid. On the one hand, it can be seen 
        25. The emphasis on competition is unusual in MS compared to Tarde’s other 
works, where co-operative relationships are more prominent. Indeed, even MS (p. 
25) emphasises that relations of reciprocal possession are more productive than 
those of unilateral possession.
        26. One might think here of the Stoic ‘seminal reasons’ (logoi spermatikoi). Cf. 
Lazzarato, ‘Gabriel Tarde’, cited above, p. 107.
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as a hypertrophied rationalism, where the most contingent mo-
tions can only be explained on the basis of the complete vision of 
reality which each monad possesses, and which it strives to actu-
alize.27 On the other hand, it implies that reality as a whole is very 
far from being rationally ordered, since it is formed in a chaotic 
and unpredictable fashion by the competition, and even more by 
the simple collision, of the trajectories of the elements. Tarde re-
tains teleological or final causes at the level of the element even 
while sharply rejecting them as explanations of the history of the 
universe as a whole.28 
Thus, the order which we see taking shape at macroscopic 
scales as a result of the temporary dominance of leading elements 
is both a reflection and a betrayal of the order which pertains at 
the level of the element. Since, Tarde argues, this order reflects 
the success of a leading monad in gaining predominance within a 
given aggregate, it represents a reinscription or projection of that 
monad’s state on a macroscopic scale. By the same token, however, 
it occludes the much greater number of subordinate monads (or, 
more precisely, those aspects of them which are not exhausted by 
their participation in the aggregate), and hence by far the greatest 
part of the aggregate’s reality. In particular, since no social order is 
permanent, the longer-term evolution of the aggregate will largely 
be determined by these subordinates, and not by the leading ele-
ment. A society presents a unified face to the outside world only to 
the extent to which it suppresses, or at least conceals, dissent be-
tween its members.
The process which culminates in the formation of a coherent 
aggregate, then, does not respond to some higher or prior princi-
ples, but to the contingency of struggle; but, again, this struggle 
is not between two atoms of sheer will but between competing 
principles, or overarching visions of the universe. One implication 
of this is that the structural forces at work in complex aggregates 
tend to reflect, if imperfectly, the universal vision of the leading 
(and other) elements, not just the fact of dominance. Social move-
ments without a clear programme, Tarde observes, are doomed 
to failure from the beginning. More than this, movements whose 
programme is in any way limited or particularistic are much less 
likely to be successful in the long term than those committed to 
        27. Lazzarato here talks of ‘the priority of the logical or intellectual element 
over the element of will’ (Lazzarato, ‘Gabriel Tarde’, cited above, p. 140).
        28. See also Social Laws, ch. III.
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a universal vision. Because the monads’ desires and beliefs are 
universal in their scope, the furthest-reaching of aggregative so-
cial forces are those which have the greatest capacity to harness 
this universality rather than suppressing it. Whether it be the bu-
reaucratic forms of politics which were destined to overcome char-
ismatic monarchy, the universalism of the great missionary reli-
gions, or (to add a further example to Tarde’s) the various political 
myths which have taken the latter’s place in the 20th and 21st cen-
turies, the most lasting and productive modes of social aggrega-
tion are those which appeal explicitly to universal visions of one 
form or another. Nonetheless, these visions are always severely 
compromised and diluted in their application; even the most har-
monious is only a pale reflection of the intense drive of the indi-
vidual element towards totality.
Thus the metaphysics of possession rejoins that other central 
tenet of monadology, that the part reflects the whole: for Tarde, 
it does so in the form of an urge to remake the whole in its own 
image by gaining hegemony over it. The reality of the particular 
lies in the drive towards universality, and the heterogeneity of the 
elements in the clash of their universalisms. The light scattered 
by the pulverized dust of reality resolves into an image of totality. 
‘What do we place within the ultimate discontinuity if not continu-
ity? We place therein … the totality of other beings. At the basis of 
each thing are all real or possible things’ (p. 27).
6. the ONtOLOGY Of ONtOLOGIeS
At this point, however, there appears to be a potentially seri-
ous methodological impasse. As I have argued, the individual 
monads’ universal visions in their pure state are only imperfectly 
reflected by the forms taken at an aggregate level, where the ele-
ments must either be subsumed, or fundamentally remake them-
selves, in the process of shaping the forms. Hence, the types of 
explanation which are possible at the two levels will be very differ-
ent. Our understanding of the individual element will flow natu-
rally from the unique vision towards which it tends, but, precise-
ly because of this, will be almost entirely inapplicable to reality, 
since the latter is composite in nature. Conversely, our under-
standing of the aggregate, while pragmatically more useful, will 
inevitably be highly imprecise.29
        29. We might relate this point to the Leibnizian problematic summarized 
by Deleuze in the form of a critique of the Cartesian principle of the ‘clear and 
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If so, this implies that explanations which are fully coherent 
are likely to be truthful only in highly unusual cases, such as the 
extreme rarefaction of Crookes’ ‘radiant matter’ state (p. 44), and 
conversely, that explanations which are adequate to the facts are 
unlikely to be coherent. Theories of highly general application (e.g. 
Newton’s laws of motion, or the laws of natural selection) will al-
ways ipso facto be highly selective and partial, and, Tarde argues, 
doomed to failure in the very long run. To be sure, at an interme-
diate level, it is possible to gain some knowledge of macroscop-
ic phenomena, but only because these phenomena are generally 
dominated by a leading element. However, such knowledge is par-
tial and provisional, comparable to the knowledge we can gain of a 
society from official statistics; because it is dependent upon a par-
ticular ontic régime, it will be valid only until the latter’s demise. 
Tarde thus exactly inverts the Aristotelian picture of scientific ex-
planation as moving from the particular to the general. Rather, 
he argues, adequate explanations always move from the general 
to the particular, from aggregates to the elements which consti-
tute them. 
Now, while this may well be methodologically productive in 
specific contexts, it seems to rule out a priori any theory or expla-
nation which claims even minimal generality. Any such theory, 
as outlined above, will be inevitably inadequate because it cannot 
escape its complicity with the movement by which the leading ele-
ments occlude the subordinate ones whence their power derives, 
and hence fails to see past the particular configuration to the crit-
ical potencies which germinate within it. Moreover, ontological 
theories, which claim to be universal explanations, would pres-
ent the most egregious examples. In particular, it is hard to deny 
that Tarde’s own theory makes highly general claims about the 
nature of reality, and should itself be ruled out by its own episte-
mological stringency, hence becoming caught in a performative 
contradiction. 
The solution to this issue presented in Tarde’s other texts30 is 
distinct’: ‘a clear idea is in itself confused; it is confused in so far as it is clear’ 
(Difference and Repetition, p. 213, original emphasis). MS, however, goes further: 
the conflation of the distinct-obscure (the elements) which gives rise to the clear-
confused (the aggregate) arises not only from an epistemic lack, but ontologically, 
from the interrelations of the elements themselves—which arguably also calls 
into question Deleuze’s own, fundamentally structuralist, solution.
        30. See Social Laws, ch. I; The Laws of Imitation (Les Lois de l’imitation), ch. I. 
In general, it should be noted that the sharp ontological contrast in MS between 
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that the heterogeneity of the elements is compatible with the exis-
tence of large-scale repetition, and that it is these repetitions that 
form the basis for scientific generalization. These repetitions do 
not simply reflect the structures of the aggregate, but are rather 
present already at the elementary level. Nonetheless, within the 
reading developed here, this response is ultimately unsatisfying. 
The repetitions of the elements would seem either to be only a 
temporary alignment of avidities, such that the epistemological 
issue remains unaddressed, or to be premised on a substrate of 
structures or behaviors which would then be the true basis of the 
elements, albeit a basis of the nature of a quantity or an event rath-
er than an entity.
A rather different resolution is suggested, if not explicitly set 
forth, by MS itself. The key would lie, again, in returning to the 
universalizing tendency of the monads. The enterprise of expla-
nation could then be seen as akin less to the process of aggregate 
formation as empirically observed, than to the universal visions 
present within each element. In that case, the scientific or meta-
physical theories we develop to explain reality would not be for-
eign to the elements, but on the contrary, would be profoundly 
continuous with the cosmic plans which form their own most in-
timate reality. Each element has, and in some sense is, an onto-
logical theory of its own. Thus, Tardean metaphysics could be de-
scribed as an ontology of ontologies: the universe is woven from 
the theorizing activity of its innumerable elements.31 What none-
theless remains inescapable in the epistemological paradox, and 
must be negotiated at each stage, is that the universal drive to 
element and aggregate is greatly softened in Tarde’s other works, which are ac-
cordingly much more sanguine regarding the intelligibility of aggregative pro-
cesses (e.g. imitation). Some readings would attempt to reconcile the texts by see-
ing the self-actualisation of the monads as simply of a piece with the formation 
of aggregates (thus E. V. Vargas, ‘Tarde on drugs, or measures against suicide’, in 
Candea, The Social after Gabriel Tarde, cited above), but this seems to go against 
the grain of MS. As Toews hints, MS may in this respect be ultimately irrecon-
cilable with Tarde’s sociological works (D. Toews, ‘The renaissance’, cited above).
        31. This insight is more likely to be familiar to the contemporary reader in 
the context of the social sciences, where one might think of ethnomethodolo-
gy’s accounts of meaning-making practices, or of Viveiros de Castro’s insight that 
‘doing anthropology means comparing anthropologies’ (E. Viveiros de Castro, 
‘Perspectival Anthropology and the Method of Controlled Equivocation’, Tipití: 
Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America, vol. 2, no. 1, 
2004, pp. 3-22). The possibility of an ontological redeployment of such ideas is, I 
think, one of the most interesting directions signposted by MS.
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dominate both blinds such theories to the truth of the dominated 
reality, and at the same time reflects the more basic truth that that 
reality is itself fundamentally determined by its own drive to dom-
ination, which is also a vision of how the universe ought to be. To 
return from the general to the particular is the goal of knowledge 
only because it brings more clearly into focus the particular’s own 
knowledge of the general, and not, as the reductionist would ar-
gue, because it unveils the mute, brute truth behind the general 
and beyond knowledge. Our understanding of reality is ultimately 
reality’s understanding of itself.
Finally, the ontological activity of the elements, and the com-
bination of fundamental kinship and mutual misdirection which 
joins the theorist with the universe theorized, are also key to rec-
onciling the two central theses of the priority of the element over 
the aggregate, and the priority of the relation between them over 
both its terms. The element is prior because the universal is con-
tained within it, in a reflection which can only be discerned con-
fusedly in the aggregate; but the relation is prior because the im-
pulse to the universal, in which the whole being of the element 
ultimately consists, must pass through the aggregate (and indeed 
is doomed never to transcend the aggregate, be it on an astronomi-
cal scale). In this sense, the forgetfulness of theory only responds 
to the forgetfulness of reality, and first and foremost, that of the 
reality of the theorist herself. The essential occlusion and obscu-
rity which infect any knowable macroscopic order are the obverse 
of the knower’s own desire to possess the known, a desire of such 
strength that it always outweighs and eclipses the counter-desires 
which ultimately make it possible.
7. huMANISM AND reALISM
In lieu of a conclusion, I would like to offer a few brief suggestions 
as to how the Tardean theory might usefully inform contemporary 
debates. I have particularly in mind the themes of humanism, or 
anthropocentrism, and realism. In fact I take these as essential-
ly a single problematic, in so far as realism is defined as holding 
that reality is independent from human cognition or experience.32 
This is one area where Tarde’s theory seems to find considerable 
contemporary resonance, since it has become clear that the critical 
project of decentring humanism, whether or not one agrees with 
        32. This definition is not entirely uncontroversial, but it saves a certain 
amount of time.
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its ultimate goals, holds considerable promise as an analytical tool, 
and may find valuable support in the theory of pansocial ontology. 
One concern here, however, is that, as critics of post-humanism 
have been quick to argue, the erasure of the boundary between 
humans and non-humans may work less to humanize the non-
human than to dehumanize the human, that is, less to extend the 
field of personal and moral relations from the human to the non-
human than to legitimize impersonal and amoral relations to hu-
man others. Traditional organicist sociology, with its frequently 
authoritarian sympathies, would be a case in point. Tarde’s theory 
does little to calm these fears, and much of it can be read in either 
direction. The analogy between social and natural law, for exam-
ple, may be seen as an extraordinary expansion of the possibilities 
of social transformation beyond the wildest dreams of the utopian 
socialist tradition, but it could equally be taken as a counsel of de-
spair for any struggle against injustice, which may as well seek to 
overthrow the law of gravity.
In any case, and aside from such abstract moralizing, the al-
ways two-sided nature of pansocial thinking means that Tarde 
cannot be regarded as unequivocally post- or anti-humanist. It is 
clear that his theory responds to the desire to situate human con-
cerns and viewpoints within the vastly greater sweep of organic 
and inorganic nature, and thus to make possible a genuinely real-
ist metaphysics. At the same time, however, it explicitly makes the 
human the measure of all things in the sense that inter-human 
social relations constitute ‘the relation par excellence’ (p. 94), the 
paradigm and framework for the system as a whole, for all that 
Tarde claims the analogical argument does not rest on specifically 
human facts (pp. 18ff.). Moreover, although Tarde does not posit a 
deep qualitative chasm between humans as cognizers and users of 
representational thought and a non-human reality devoid of these 
capacities, there is still a consequential quantitative difference. 
The possessive relation of the mind to the objects of its thought is 
in general not reciprocated, and thought enjoys a ‘special domin-
ion over the world’ (p. 55). The reason for this is that possession by 
physical means is inevitably limited in extent; even the most mas-
sive celestial bodies can only bring so many others within their 
field of action. In the realm of organic life this is less true, as wit-
nessed by the capacity of microsopic organisms to destroy physi-
cally much greater ones through infection. Cognitive representa-
tion, however, goes beyond even this in allowing the possession of 
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any entity at all, transcending any requirement of physical pres-
ence. That is, the primacy of human societies in the theory is not 
merely a question of expository convenience, but reflects an ines-
capable fact about the place of humans in reality. 
Thus, if, as argued above, the world should fundamentally be 
seen as a contest of theories, this contest does not take place on a 
level playing field; some elements and societies have considerable 
advantages. Moreover, this ontological fact about human beings 
resonates with the primary argument for accepting pansocial on-
tology, namely its foundation in our immediate sense of our own 
being—in, finally, our being human. The monadological theory, 
then, post-humanistically points to the contingency of its own de-
velopment out of the situatedness of a text written by and for hu-
man beings. At the same time, however, as an ontology of ontolo-
gies, it elevates this contingency of theoretical elaboration to the 
principle of reality itself. In terms of realism, and by way of res-
urrecting one of its long-buried adversaries, Tarde’s theory is ulti-
mately less realist than it is social constructionist—not, of course, 
in that reality is socially constructed, but in that it is socially con-
structing, the broken surface of an ocean of sociality which far ex-
ceeds the human and yet is one with it.

Gabriel Tarde’s Monadology and Sociology, origi-
nally published in 1893, is a remarkable and un-
classifiable book. It sets out a theory of ‘universal 
sociology’, which aims to explicate the essentially 
social nature of all phenomena, including the 
behaviour of atoms, stars, chemical substances 
and living beings. He argues that all of nature con-
sists of elements animated by belief and desire, 
which form social aggregates analogous to those 
of human societies and institutions. In developing 
this central insight, Tarde outlines a metaphysical 
system which builds on both classical rationalist 
philosophy and the latest scientific theories of the 
time, in a speculative synthesis of extraordinary 
range and power.
Tarde’s work has only recently returned to promi-
nence after a long eclipse. His work was an impor-
tant influence on later theorists including Deleuze 
and Latour, and has been widely discussed in the 
social sciences, but has rarely been a focus of 
philosophical interest. The translator’s afterword 
provides an explication of the key ideas in the 
text and situates Tarde’s theory within the context 
of the philosophical tradition, arguing for the 
importance of the text as a highly original work 
of systematic ontology, and for its importance for 
contemporary theoretical debates.
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Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904) was a 
French sociologist, criminologist 
and social theorist. He held the 
chair in modern philosophy at 
the Collège de France. His works 
cover a wide range of interests; 
he is best known for his theories 
of imitation and his work on 
crowd psychology, and for his 
debates on sociological theory 
with Émile Durkheim.
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